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INTRODUCTION
There have been numerous articles written about Argen-
tina which are in the greater part of a conflicting nature.
These analyses instead of aiding a reader's understanding of
the situation usually tend to increase his bewilderment. This
study was to learn whether the strained relations were due to
Argentina Beef, Argentine jealousy, or because of poor diploma-
tic relations.
To cover this study as fully as possible this work has
been divided in five principal sections.
In Section I, the main economic, geographical, histo-
rical, and political factors for the first three hundred years in
Argentina's life are discussed. Section II deals primarily with
the financial, industrial and economic conditions. Section III
is concerned in showing the development of Argentine exports and
imports from 1875 to the present, while Section IV deals with the
trade relations of the United States and Argentina from their
beginning. Section V, first of all, deals with "Stumbling
Blocks" which have been troublesome to better relations. The
second part of this Section deals with what the United States has
done or hasn't done to help Argentina, and Argentina's position
in the war both economically and politically.
I have stated the important economic and political
facts because one is necessarily influenced by the other and,
at times this may be overlooked.
The monetary values which I have used, have been the
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United States dollar, the paper peso, and the gold peso. The
paper peso has averaged approximately 30 cents. On September
27, 1939, the peso was pegged to the United States dollar at
the rate of 3,3582 peso equal to 1 dollar or a paper peso
equalled 29.773 cents. In 1941 a special export rate was fixed
at 23.704 cents. A gold peso is worth 2.2727 times as much as
a paper peso.
It was more convenient and clear for me to use the
word "American" when referring to the United States, and "Argen-
tines" when referring to Argentina.
Michael Mosca
March 23, 1944

Glossary of Spanish Terms
Cordillera range of mountains
Chaoo from Quechue
,
hunting grounds
Quebracho hardwood trees of South America, a wood
rich in tannin
Estancieros cattle breeding aristocracy
Golono ; roving sharecropper-really means colonist
Aoopiador ——middle man who finances the Golono
Portenos people of the port (Buenos Aires)
Criollos name applied to Mestizos (see page 9)
Mestizo offspring of a Spaniard and Indian
Conquistadores Spanish Conqueror
Adelantazgo System by which private individuals had
been granted the right to colonize ter-
ritories at their own expense in exchange
for the privilege of governing it.
Junta Congress, assembly
Caudillo Political Boss
Gaucho South American cowboy
Caja de Conversion—Gold Conversion Office
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Section I
Argentina - Today and Yesterday
Topographical Data
Argentina, with its area of 1,079,965 square miles
extends 2,300 miles in length between the twenty- second and
fifty-fifth parallels of south latitude. Its greatest breadth
is 905 miles, but over most of its area it is much narrower
than that. It is about one-third the size of the United States
(38%) and occupies the entire southern half of the South American
continent, except for the narrow strip west of the Andes that
comprises Chile and the tiny Republic of Uruguay on the East, (l)
If this long, wedge-shaped country were placed on
the North American continent, in reversed position correspond-
ing to the reversed latitudes and seasons, it would extend
from torrid Tampico, Mexico to Winnipeg, Canada which is with-
in the cold Labradorean latitudes. The widest area would then
stretch from Memphis to Amarillo, Texas, and Buenos Aires
would be on the latitude of Cape Hatteras.
It is interesting to note that the entire territory
of Argentina lies east of the longitude of New York City. The
Andean frontier between Chile and Argentina lies directly south
of Boston, and Buenos Aires is about 400 miles east of the longi-
tude of Halifax. In fact, Buenos Aires is seven degrees east
of Bermuda.
(1) See Table I, Page 5
Also see Map, Page 125
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Everyone knows of the pampas of Argentina, but few
know that Argentina has six mountains that are higher than Mount
McKinley, Aconcagua reaching forth 23,081 feet high is the high-
est in the Western Hemisphere, (l) Aconcagua and its five less
mightier mountains stand on the mighty cordillera of the Andes,
which extends along the entire western edge of the country.
Geographically, Argentina may be divided into three
great plains-the sub-tropical, hilly Gran Chaco in the north,
the temperate, flat Pampa of the central region, and the sub-
arctic plateau district of Patagonia in the south. The bulk of
the territory lies within the temperate zone, and here the great
centers of population and economic activity are to be found.
The Chaco district is a region of unnavigable, mean-
dering streams, inhabited in its unsettled portions by jaguars,
alligators, snakes, and migratory birds. The Indians call it
"chaco", which is Quechua for "hunting grounds". The northern
part of this region produces fine hardwoods in great abundance
and is the center of the "quebracho" industry which produces
tannin extract for the tanneries of the United States and Europe.
The southern part, where the timber has been cleared away, is
the region of Argentina^ cotton and tobacco fields.
Northeast of the pampas is another very productive
but much smaller agricultural region which is known as the
"Mesopotamia" country, lying between the rivers Parens and
Uruguay and embracing the provinces of hntre Rios and Corrientes
(1) U.S. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, "Argent ina
,
Profile of a Nation, " Page 11

and the 'territory of Misiones. These two provinces produce the
best and cleanest wool in the country and also considerable lin-
seed and fruit. Misiones juts into Brazilian territory and it
produces most of Argent ina's yerba-mate tea.
In the Province of Mendoza, at the foot of the imdes,
and along the Rio Negro in northern Patagonia, irrigation has
produced two very rich fruit and wine centers, Mendoza and
Tucuman.
Patagonia, extending from the Rio Negro southward to
the Strait of Magellan is a windswept and stony desert. It
includes the territories of Rio Negro, Chubut, and Santa Cruz
and rises gradually from the Atlantic to the foothills of the
-Andes. Parts of central Patagonia are devoted to sheep-rais-
ing; the extreme southern part is covered with heavy forests;
and on the Atlantic seaboard in the vicinity of Gomodoro Riva-
davia are to be found Argentina's largest petroleum fields.
The Pampas, which has one-fifth of the nation's ter-
ritory has been endowed with an almost ideal combination of
fertile soil, w»rm sunshine, and abundant rainfall which has
made the country wealthy with very little effort on the part
of those who control the wealth. Production costs of high-
grade meats, grain, and wool are so low that the world's buy-
ers compete for them. Many sources of wealth have not been
tapped yet becaouse it is so much easier to produce the meats
and grains and wool for which markets already exist.
Argentine rivers, which originate in the Andean west
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or the forested north, drain into five great river systems, all
of which flow easterly into the -Atlantic Ocean, as do all major
rivers of South America. The Parana, Paraguay, and Uruguay
Rivers, 7/hich comprise the Plata's river system are navigable
for more than a thousand miles, and on their shores are located
some of Argentina's greatest commercial cities. (1)
In the mountainous regions of Argentina many poten-
tial and as yet undeveloped water power sites abound, especially
at the great Iguazu Falls, 300 miles north of Buenos Aires.
(1) U.S. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Op. Cit. Page 13
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Table I
Area and Population of Argentina
Federal District Prov- Area Est . Pop *
lnces and Territories Eng. sq. Miles Jan. 1,194-2
Federal District
Buenos Aires (Fed. Cap.) 71 2,408,900
Provinces
Buenos Aires 118,467 3,561,727
Santa Fe 52,056 1,577,545
Cordoba 64,924 1,315,106
Entre Rlos 30,243 766,639
Corrientes 34,325 535,757
Provinces
Tucuman 8,817 564,046
Mendoza 57,445 533,068
Santiago del Estero 53,451 511,388
Salta 48,872 222,683
San Juan 34,532 226,746
San Luis 29,700 203,748
Catamarca 30,178 155,295
La Rioja 33,394 113,541
Jujuy 16,705 118,514
Territories
La Pampa 55,669
Misiones 11,749
Chaco 37,930
Rio Negro 77,610
Chubut* 87,152
Neuquen 37, 245 702, 234
Formosa 29,143
Sant Cruz 93,952
Los Andes 28,091
Tierra Del Fuego 8.344
Tot. for territories 466,865
Grand total 1,079,965 13,516,927
Source: Statesman's Year-Book, 1943
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The People
Approximately seventy percent of the country's
13,516,927 people (1) live in the city of Buenos Aires and on
or just around the pampas. The five principal cities border
this area, but there are no important towns on the pampas them-
selves. (2) The bulk of the productive land is owned by a
few thousand families and the greater percent of the acreage
is cultivated by tenant farmers whose standard of living is
extremely low. (3)
In Buenos Aires province alone, "The Queen Province",
fifty families have holdings of 75,000 acres or more; the hold-
ings of these fifty comprise 15.2% of the total area of the
province. (4)
Estancieros
These "estancieros", the cattle-breeding aristocracy,
have several fixed views. They are supposed to be, on the
whole, rather anti-United States, partly on nationalist grounds,
partly because we exclude their beef. Second, they tend to
oppose industrialization which Argentina needs. They fear that
through industrialiEation, their imports of manufactured goods
would necessarily have to be curtailed which would result in
the reduction of their export of beef.
(1) See Table 1, Pape 5
(2) South American Handbook, 1542
(3) U.S. Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Op. Cit. Page 3
Also see Chapter II, Page 30 for Agricultural Census of 1937
(4) G-unther, J., "Inside Latin America", Page 297

Oolono
The "Colono" is a roving sharecropper, even though the
wore really means colonist. Since he does not own any land, the
"colono" contracts to till a piece of land, usually 100 to 150
hectares (247 to 350 acres), for a period varying from two to
five years. He turns over to the landlord from one-fourth to one
half, usually one-third, of what he produces. The "colono" is
not a farmer but is a grower of grain. He buys his vegetables
and meat. Naturally, since any improvement he makes reverts back
to the landlord without any compensation, he doesn't make any.
Thus, his family lives on a very low plane which is placed slight
ly above that of anifcals.
The "Oolono" plows his land in April and does not do
anything else until June when he plants his wheat. He handles
money once a year when he sells his crop, but before he gets it
he usually owes it all to the "acopiador". The "acopiador" is
the middle man who finances the "Colono" during the year, and
thus, is able to corner all the crops in his district before they
are sold to the big exporting firms. The "acopiador" usually
owns the general store in the nearest town and so the "colono" is
forced to buy at the store where higher prices are usually
charged. (1) The crop has to be delivered in new jute bags and
these have to be bought from the "acopiador", who also rents the
threshing machine which is hired at so much a bushel.
Since, the "colono" is usually in debt he has to sell
(1) White, J.W. , "Argent ina-The Life Story of a Nation", Page 8
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his grain immediately,, and since everyone else is doing the same
the prices are at their lowest. However, the "acopiador" stores
the grain in his warehouse or piles it in huge stacks near the
railroad station and sells it when the price is high enough for
a good profit.
Meanwhile the "colono" considers himself lucky to pay
off his debts and to begin the new year penniless but without
a carryover of old debts to be worked off. If he has two or
three bad years he accumulates such a debt that his situation is
hopeless and he ends up by wandering off to some other part of
the country to try again. The "acopiador" and the land owner
never lose. The "solono" is the only one who loses. (1)
The jute bags which have already been mentioned play
a considerable part towards adding to the plight of the "colono".
The jute, essential for the manufacture of grain bags, is imported
from India, Since this is a very important item in British trade
with Argentina, the British-owned railroads have understandably
hesitated to build elevators that would do away with the bag bus-
iness and thus, ruin the jute trade. (2)
In 1935, the Argentine government began the construc-
tion of some 300 country and terminal elevators at an estimated
cost of $28 r000, 000, which were to be owned and operated by the
government. When completed, these elevators were to advance
negotiable warrants against the grain delivered to them, and the
(1) White, J. 7/., Op. Cit. Page 8
(2) Ibid, Page 8
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government hoped that the elevators and the National Grain Board
eventually would be able to aid the "colono", especially in his
economic slavery to the "acopiador".
Moreover, in August 1940, a Homestead Law was passed,
sketching the beginning of a land reform. Its aim is to divide
up unproductive big estates, settle small farmers on the land
and improve the housing conditions of the peons.
Taking these factors into consideration and even con-
sidering the fact that the land class has lost much of its former
power and that social reform is spreading, I Qon't believe that
the conditions of the "colono" have improved, as yet, to any
material extent. (1)
Argentina is referred to as the only South American
country whose middle class enjoys a life of comfort. (2) How-
ever, nine-tenths of the people are poor but poverty for the poor
does not entail the suffering that it does in colder climates in
countries where food is scarce or costly. Argentina* s poor suffer
from inadequate housing, insufficient clothes, and other such
items, but there is little hunger, even among the poorest.
The "pride" of the Argentinians is manifested in a strong
way even among themselves. The people of Buenos Aires call them-
selves "portenos", or people of the port. The people of the in-
terior, with as much pride, call themselves "criollos". When the
Spanish Conquerors united with the Indian women, a new, ethnical
(1) See Pan American Economics, Olson, P.R.and Hickman, C.A.,
Page 177-180
(2) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Page 9
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type-the "mestizo", resulted. These "mestizos" were designated
by the common name of "criollos", a term which also applied to
the native sons of Europeans, to the sons of Europeans and "mes-
tizos", and to the sons of "mestizos" and "mestizas". The Pampa
Indians have been exterminated and pushed far back into Fatagonia
until it is estimated that there are only some 20,000 to 30,000
left. Great tides of Spanish and Italian immigration have given
the white man's blood a predominance in Argentina which, af all
South American nations, is surpassed only by Uruguay.
The growth of Argentina* s population is indicated in
Table II by the returns of its three national censuses.
Table II
National Censuses of Argentina
First Census 1869 1,736,923 (1)
Second Census 1895 3,954,911 (1)
Third Census 1914 7,885,237 (1)
Estimated 1942 13,516,927 (2)
Source: Phelps, L.P. , "The International Economic Positions of
Argentina", Page 18
(2) Statesman's Year Book, 1943
At the estimated figure fcbr 1942, the density of popu-
lation per square mile is only 12.5, in comparison to the United
States, which has a density of over 42.
The net overseas immigration from 1857, when records
were first compiled, to 1913 was 3,373,292 persons. (1)
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Cit. Page 18
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Frora 1910 to 1935, a olassif ioat ion of Argentina^
nationality was as follows:
Spaniards 1, 178,510
Italians 1. 047,527
Poles 145,517
Germans 97,343
Russians 82,340
French 48,885
Portuguese 47,788
Others 452,455
Total 3, 100,365
Source: (l) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Cit. Page 20
Of the total population of 12,227,761 in 1935, the
total immigration covering this twenty-five year period accounted
for liitle more than one-fourth. (1)
Thus, nearly 80$ of the immigrants have been Italians
and Spaniards. However, since the Italian government discouraged
emigration In 1927, the percentage of non-Latin immigrants in-
creased, especially due to the increase in German immigration
during the middle twenties.
Today, there are probably some 3,000,000 people of
Italian blood in Argentina but Italians assimilate very quickly.
As John Gunther, in his "Inside Latin America" states: In ten
years they become more Argentine than the Argentines. (2)
(1) Statesman* s Year Book, 1936
(2) Gunther, J., Op. Cit. Page 309
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Germans are estimated at 425,000 and they are, as a
whole, much more patriotic to ^ermany than the Italians are to
their native land. (1)
Argentina f s Tragic Beginning
Don Pedro de Mendoza and the men who journeyed under
him to the River Plate in 1535 were prominent in the founding
of Buenos Aires and Asuncion. These men unlike the men who had
come to the United States to establish a home secure from oppres-
sive laws and poverty had settled Argentina because of the legend
of the fabulous mineral riches of the region and also for the
necessity of erecting a bulwark against the extension of the
Portuguese conquest. (2)
Pedro de Mendoza landed in February, 1536 and estab-
lished a small settlement called Puerto de Santa Maria de los
Buenos Aires, in honor of Our Lady of Fair Winds, the patron
saint of sailors.
The Indians were friendly at first, but due to the
brutality of the Spaniards, they were antagonized and became
warlike.
Mendoza died June, 1537 and appointed Ruiz Galan as
his successor. Irala, one of the most unscrupulous "Conquis-
tadores", refused to recognize Galan as Mendoza' s successor.
Irala 1 s ruthlessness led to the burning of the settlement called
Buenos Aires. Thus, five and one-half years after the founding
(1) Gunther, J., Op. Cit. Page 306
(2) Levene, Ricardo, "A History of Argentina", Page 17
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of Buenos Aires, nothing remained of the settlement except the
burned ruins and the horses and mares which were abandoned on
the Pampas.
Founding; of Buenos Aires
In 1580, Garay, deputy of the Government in Paraguay,
undertook the refounding of Buenos Aires, He laid out a new
settlement in 144 squares of approximately 100- by 100 yards, cut
by streets of 11 yards wide, which crossed at right angles. The
land around the settlement was used for commercial crops and
grazing. The outlying land was laid out in agricultural tracts
of approximately !§- by 3i§- miles. These tracts were given to
the soldiers, and the Indian families that had been brought from
Paraguay, men and women, were distributed on the land to work
as slaves of the owners. As there were not enough Indians to
work all this land, Garay and his followers went out among the
near-by tribes and captured others.
But the Indians along the Riachuelo, in the vicinity
of Pedro de Mendoza's site whioh Garay had found too low, swampy,
and unsuitable for a settlement, were now more opposed to the
presence of the Spaniards than they had been forty years earlier.
However, before the Indians could ally themselves for an attack,
Garay attacked and completely destroyed them.
Since there was no mineral wealth in the vicinity of
Buenos Aires, the settlement necessarily became an agricultural
colony. In Peru, Mexico, and Chile, where the Spaniards were
using the Indians as slaves in the mines, there were two classes
of society-the rich Spaniards and the poor Indians. In Buenos
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Aires, everyone was on nearly the same economic level, only
slightly above poverty and everyone had to work.
Colonial Period
The second founding of Buenos Aires opened the era
of colonization and brought to a close the preliminary era of
conquest. In 1591, the Grown abolished the system of "adelan-
tazgon by which private individuals had been permitted to col-
onize certain territory at their own expense in exchange for
the privilege of governing it. The system had proven itself
unworkable because of the conflict in interest of the "Adelan-
tado T * and the Crown.
The King decided to put the colonies in charge of
governors and from 1591 to 1621, the River Plate had nine gov-
ernors. In 1617, by a royal cedula, the Grown separated Bue-
nos Aires from Paraguay and established them as two distinct
colonies under the jurisdiction of the viceroy at Lima.
As it has already been mentioned on page 10, that
even though this region had been named the River Plate, there
was no silver. Thus, while the Spaniards in Peru and Chile
were looting the wealth of the Indians, the men of the River
Plate set about to produce wealth from the land. The millions
of wild cattle and horses grazing on the pampas offered easy
wealth. It was easy labor to kill the animals by the hundreds
and remove their hides and fat. The hides and tallow of Bue-
nos Aires found a ready market in Europe. The first cargo of
the River Plate hides was dispatched to Spain three years after
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the founding of Buenos Aires.
In 1597, seventeen years after the founding of Buenos
Aires, the exports of flour amounted to 1,498 bushels, at a
value of 39,280 reales (1) or $4,910. The imports were val-
ued at 67,817 reales, which included the price of Negro Slaves
that already were brought into the colony. (2)
However, the River Plate colonists encountered op-
position to their trade with Europe when, in 1598, Philip II
prohibited all trade, incoming or outgoing, through the port
of Buenos -Aires, and in the following year, death was decreed
as the penalty for violation of this edict.
The Spanish government enforced a strict trade mono-
poly with the purpose of keeping all the profits and to prevent
any of the colonies from developing to the extent where they
might offer serious competition to Spain. The colonists were
prohibited from engaging in industry, which might have made
them economically independent of Spain. The colonies were
maintained as producers of raw materials but they were not
allowed to grow grapes or olives which would have provided
wine and oil at much lower prices than that which they had to
pay. ^lso, flax and hemp couldn't be raised, and the trading
in salt, tobacco, and gunpowder was a very strict monopoly of
(1) The "real" was worth 12^- cents and the famous ''pieces of
eight", which were the forefather of the -American silver
dollar, were so called because they were worth 8 reales.
(2) In 1595, a royal cedula was issued, authorizing Pedro Gomer
Reynel to introduce 600 Negroes per annum into these provin-
ces for a term of nine years. At this time, Negroes sold
at prices varying between sixty and Seventy pesos.
Levene, Ricardo, Op. Cit. Page 101
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the Grown. Since, the only colony interested in trade at this
time was Buenos Aires, it, of course, suffered most from these
monopoly decrees.
Trade Monopoly Decree of 1599
The trade-monopoly decree of 1599, established the
death penalty and confiscation of property for violation, also
closed all the ports of South America and required the colon-
ists to export and import from Puerto Bello, which is on the
northern shore of the Isthmus of Panama. Moreover, Puerto
Bello could only trade with Seville, which was. called head-
quarters of Spanish Monopoly. A convoy was sent (tout twice a
year in order that the galleons might he accompanied by armed
vessels tp protect them from the English and Dutch Filibusters
which were after the Silver and gold being shipped to Spain.
Nothing could be shipped legally, either to or from South
merica, except by convoys.
White, in his "Argentina", describes the transport-
ation of goods to Buenos Aires as follows:
"Merchandise for Buenos Aires had to
be unloaded at Puerto Bello, carried
across the isthmus on muleback, put on
coastwise vessels to Gallao or Africa,
and again loaded and transferred to the
backs of mules for the 2,523 mile jour-
ney from Lima to the River Plate. The
pack trains usually were made up of a-
bout 200 mules, ambling along by twos,
their tails tied to the necks of the
ones following, to prevent any of them
from straying. As can be easily imag-
ined, the price of merchandise carried
in this manner reached a fabulous height
by the time the goods reached Buenoos
Aires. The pastoral and agricultural
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products of A the River Plate could not be
exported as only precious stones and me-
tals, rare drugs and other articles of
great value for small bulk could stand
the cost of transport under such condi-
tions." (1)
Dissatisfaction
Needless to say, this trade monopoly provoked many
protests. The discussion of maritime laws and the customs
regulations led to the growth of a strong local sentiment, a
nationalism that was absent from the rest of South America.
Concession of 1618
In 1618, the colony was granted permission to send
two vessels to Spain each year, but they could not be larger
than 100 tons each. This was the most important trade conces-
sion made to Buenos Aires in nearly a hundred years. All com-
mercial intercourse with the other Spanish colonies in South
America remained prohibited under the law.
Smuggling
Under such conditions, the only possible result was
that smuggling was soom to thrive and Buenos Aires became the
great center with the willing aid of the English, Dutch, and
Portuguese.
Transoceanic Trade
It wasn't until 1774 that the colonies were granted
permission to engage in transoceanic trade. Nine ports in
Spain and twenty-four in the colonies were opened to commerce
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Git. Page 52

-18-
but the trade was still confined to Spaniards and to Spanish
shipping. The effect of this law was great. Before 1774, the
legal exports of hides from the River Plate did not exceed
150,000 per year. However, as a result of the new regulation,
the number rose to between 700,000 and 800,000 per year and in
1783 totaled 1,400,000.
Levene, in his "History of .Argentina" states that:
"with respect to Buenos Aires, in each
year of the period from 1792 to 1796- .
years of the greatest economic pros-
perity-foreign commerce amounted to
7,212,000 pesos, of which 2,545,000
pesos were imports and 4,667,000 pesos,
exports. Thus, there was a favorable
balance of trade amounting to about
2,000,000 pesos per annum. Between
1772 and 1776, scarcely thirty-five
ships had entered Buenos Aires, while
after 1792, the figures were as follows:
Years Vessels exports in Pesos
1792 62 4,511,594
1793 59 5,744,112
1794 62 5,715,009
1795 51 5,134,071
1796 77 5,470,675 (1)
Source: (l) Levene, Ricardo, Op, Cit. Page 109
On November 24, 1791 permission was granted to carry
on the slave traffic from numerous ports. Negro slaves were
admitted free of duty and vessels could take cargoes of specie
and produce upon which a duty of six percent was imposed. This
concession to the negro traffic was made to promote agriculture
and thus, vessels were likewise permitted to introduce farm
implements.
Viceroyalty of the River Plate 1776
Buenos Aires had developed rapidly, commercially
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and politically, so that in 1776 the Crown realized that Buenos
Aires should be given the same importance and position as Lima
and Mexico City. Thus, the Viceroyalty of the River Plate
was created.
This great Viceroyalty extended from the Strait of
Magellan to the southern frontier of the present Republic. of
Feru. Thus, it included the present republics of Argentine,
Uruguay, Paraguay and Bolivia. Since the capital of the Vice-
royalty was established at Buenos Aires, it became a great poli-
tical, economic and social center. The Viceroyalty was in
force only thirty-three years during which there were eleven
viceroys, Pedro de Cevallo being the first.
Between 1620 and 1776, the River Plate colony had
twenty-eight governors, of which only four rulecl ten years.
The average was five and a half years and of the eleven vic-
roys between 1777 and 1810, only three remained as long as
five years and seven were in office only two years or less.
It is obvious that a viceroy, even if he were interested in
the welfare of the colony and not in his future relations
with the Crown, could have done very little in his short span
of office. In fact, all the Viceroys, with the exception of
Liniers, were interested in pleasing the Crown.
The English Invasion
The English had been engaged in the smuggling trade
with Buenos Aires for nearly two centuries. However, after
the American Revolution and the loss of the colonies in North
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America, England had to have the Spanish American ports opened
to English trade. The English government and leading Englishmen
had taken part in several schemes for the liberation of the
South American colonies hut without success. England had been
at war with Spain for a long period, and in 1805, the Spanish
and French fleets were defeated at the battle of Trafalgar,
^fter $his engagement, the English sent a fleet under Sir Home
Popham to capture the Dutch colony at the Gape of Good Hope,
which was accomplished in January, 1806. Fopham, being one
of the enthusiasts for South American trade, took it upon him-
self to cross over to the River Plate to capture the Spanish
Viceroyalty that had its capital at Buenos Aires. The troops
under the command of William C. Beresford were successful and
on June 27,1806, the capital was taken.
Since Sobremente had fled when the English had come,
there was no leader for the people until Gaptain Santiago Lin-
iers, a French-born officer, built up an army and on August 12,
1806 defeated the English. This victory awakened an enthusi-
astic spirit in the people and men who had been opposed to the
forming of a volunteer militia now eagerly trained. An army
of 8,000 was formed, consisting of 3,000 Spaniards and 5,000
native-born "criollos". It is interesting to note that this
"oriollo" militia was the beginning of the patriot army that
eventually was to wrest the independence from Spain.
The English made two more attempts to capture Bue-
nos .ires but before the army was ready to sail under the
c
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Duke of Wellington in its third attempt Spain appealed to Eng-
land for help against Napoleon. Therefore, since England aid-
ed Spain, Argentina was spared being invaded.
Influence on Free Trade
The English had been in control of Buenos Aires for
less than two months but their economic effects were great.
Beresford had declared free trade and had permitted the expor-
tation, at good prices, of large quantities of produce that had
accumulated and which would have rotted under the monopoly ef-
fect. The colonists had also received the large shipments of
English manufactured goods without having to pay the large cost
of the long overland haul from Lima. Beresford had lowered the
customs duties, abolished the State monopoly on salt, tobacco,
and other products, and suppressed the interprovincial customs
duties, with the result that the public administration could be
carried on with a smaller expenditure.
Influence on Independence
After the English invasions, several projects for in-
dependence were proposed and Oisneros, who was the last viceroy
of the River Plate, found his territory in a state of political
upheaval and economic bankruptcy and he was met with strong re-
sistance from the people, who were demanding self-government.
Faced with this strong opposition, he took decisive steps in-
cluding the opening of all ports of the Viceroyslty to trade
with England and Portugal. The cost of this administration
totaled 250,000 pesos a month, resulting in a deficit of
Ii
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1,800,000 pesos a year. However, the opening of the ports pro-
duced a revenue of 5,000,000 pesos a year, which exceeded the
government's expenses by a good amount. (1)
Independence
The revolution which took place on May 25, 1810 was
to liberate the entire South .American continent. It was fund-
amentally based on the French ideology. The French inspiration
is still commemorated in the Argentine coat-pf-arms in whioh
the Phrygian liberty cap appears above the clasped hands of the
great republican slogan - Liberty, Equality, Fraternity - which
was adopted from the French Revolution as the slogan of the
Argentine uprising. Ironically enough, on the 18th of May,
news reached Buenos i^ires that Napoleon had swept southward
across the Feninsula and occupied Seville and Cadiz. This
news couldn't be kept secret and the people realized that the
moment was near at hand and on May 25, 1810 the people took
over. This was most effectively illustrated by White in quot-
ing Bartolome Mitre as follows:
"The Revolution was effected without
bayonets or. violence, by pure pressure
of public opinion, triumphant on the
grounds of reason, law and public wel-
fare; abstaining from persecutions, it
with dignity removed the chains which
had bound the nation and assumed the
rights of sovereignty with uprightness
and moderation." (2)
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Git. Page 63
(2) Ibid, Page 77
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The Viceroyalty of the River Plate, at the outbreak
of the revolution, had an area of 2,500,000 square miles.
During the war of independence, the Viceroyslty broke up into
four inflependent states as Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and
Uruguay.
Anarchy
The revolutionary government in Buenos Aires was
changed frequently in an effort to appease the conflicting po-
litical views in the country. The First Junta of nine members
governed from May 25th to December 18, 1810, the Second Junta
of twenty-one members was in power from December 18, 1810 to
September 23, 1811. This was followed by the First Triumvirate
which governed from September 23,1811 to October 8 of the fol-
lowing year, and the Second Triumvirate lasted only four months,
from October 8, 1812 to February 20, 1813. There were seven
Supreme Directors from 1814 to 1820, four of whom served a few
months each in the year, 1815.
The declaration of independence was made six years
later on July 9, 1816. It wasn't made sooner because they had
attempted ro find a suitable prince to head a monarchy and as
it became evident that this was impossible and that some form
of republican government would have to be set up, the rivalry
between the city of Buenos Aires and the interior grew more and
more intense, resulting in the formation of two parties, the
Unitarians and the Federalists.
The Unitarians were made up mostly of the wealthier
t
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families living in Buenos Aires and who were descendants of
nobles, adelantados, governors, viceroys, and other civil or
military authorities. They insisted on a constitutional gov-
ernment with the governing power in the hands of the ruling
class, accustomed to govern by tradition and education, similar
to the ruling class in England. The Federalists were "the rab-
ble"- the provincials, the masses of "gauchos and mestizos" of
the pampas. These despised Buenos Aires as a self-styled Queen
City trying to lord it over the rest of the country and they
refused to yield to the dictates of the aristocratic oligarchy.
The state of affairs became so entangled that on
February 2, 1820, the Congress adjourned and the Supreme Di-
rectors at Buenos Aires resigned. After ten years of effort
to unite the country, the national government disappeared and
the Province of Buenos Aires attempted to hold the nation to-
gether. However, the provinces seceded and set about estab-
lishing their own constitutions.
Argent ina*s social and institutional life began to
take form from the crisis of 1820 and not from the revolu-
tion of 1810. Moreover, it was from 1820 that the"caudillo"
began to be an important factor in Argentine history as the
representative of the masses in the interior. Ten years of
foreign trade, especially with England, had resulted in a
tremendous and indiscriminate slaughter of cattle so that
the gauchos" ( cowboys) began to work for leading 'estancieros"
who provided them with food end money. Thus, the owner was

admired and even worshipped by these "gauchos" who were as simple
as children. Because of this admiration, the "patron" began to
feel proud of his power and, naturally, his desire for command
and authority grew.
The governors of the Province of Buenos Aires had been
working from 1820 to bring together the provinces and in 1824
a constituent assembly finally met and drew up a Unitarian
Constitution in 1826 and elected Bernardino Rivadavia first
President of the Argentine Republic without consulting the
provinces or waiting for their action on the Constitution.
This Constitution was rejected by the provinces and civil war
broke out again. Rivadavia resigned on June 27, 1827. Soon
afterwards Vincente Lopez became acting president but the
situation was beyond control and he resigned a few days later.
On August 12, 1828, Manuel Dorrego was proclaimed gover-
nor of Buenos Aires and he also attempted to bring the provin-
ces together but he was "executed" by his troops who mutinied
against him. As a result of this, Rosas, in 1828, was pro-
claimed governor with dictatorial powers, but, in 1831, after
his three year term, he refused to accept re-election and re-
tired to his"estancea". The Civil wars continued and the
entire country was in a state of savagery. In 1835, the
legislature of Buenos Aires sent again for Rosas to restore
law and order and gave him unlimited dictatorial powers which
he accepted.
At the end of his five-year term, in 1840, Rosas re-
signed. He was re-elected with even more powers and, while
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he had kept more or less within the limits of constitutional
power during his first term, he began, in 1840, a reign of
terror which has found its unenviable place in Argentine his-
tory. In 1851, General Justo de Urqiuza, governor of the Pro-
vince of Entre Rios, began a military campaign against Rosas,
assisted by the Province of Gorrientes and by Brazil and Uru-
guay. Rosas was defeated on February 5, 1852, and he resigned
and spent the remainder of his years in England.
In his seventeen years of power, Rosas killed or ex-
iled all the liberals who raised him to power. The masses
idolized him but he closed their schools, burned their books,
and reduced t hem to the level of vassals. He subjected the
Province of Buenos Aires to t he worst form of unitarian rule,
yet his motto was federalism, with death to the Unitarian. (1)
However, it was Rosas who destroyed the power of the
"gaucho eaudillos" who overran the country and had prevented
the establishment of any centralized government. Thus, the
"gaucho" had become used to authority and Argentina was ready
to begin its life as a nation.
Federation
On May 25, 1862, ten years after Rosas' defeat, the
first constitutional president, Bartolome Mitre, was chosen by
the unanimous electoral vote of the Electoral College. These
ten years were spent in quarreling and fighting. In all,
Argentina's efforts to set up a constitutional form of govern-
(1) White, J.W., Op.Cit. Page 101
Also see Levene, R.
,
Op. Cit. Page 413
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ment had consumed and wasted fifty years, fifty years of strife,
which many believe have retarded Argentina from being one of the
greatest nations on earth. Certainly, the growth and the progress
of Argentina since 1862 has been great and if these first years
had been half as productive, Argentina would, indeed, be a great
nation.
The Argentine Constitution
The Argentine Constitution is supposed to provide the
finest example to be found anywhere, of the application of Eng-
lish law under Spanish administration. The Constitution of
May 1, 1853, was inspired by, and largely copied from, the
Constitution of the United States of America. Ricardo Levene
recounts in his "History of Argentina" that the secretariat of
the Constituent Assembly which met at Santa Fe in 1853 had pro-
cured a copy of Alexander Hamilton's Federalist, which was to
have served as a guide for the delegates who had already deter-
mined on a federal Constitution similar to the United States. (1)
However, in the Argentine Constitution, the national
government has the right to intervene in the provinces, over-
throw the elected governor, legislature, and other authorities,
and put the province under the rule of a Federal commissioner
who is known as the Federal Interventor. This power was given
to the national government to enable it to restore order when
necessary and prevent further secession of the province, but it
has become a powerful political instrument which has enabled the
(1) Levene, R.
,
Op. Cit. Page 450
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Unitarians of Buenos Aires to continue to rule the country as
a unitarian organization in spite of its federalist Constitution.
The powers of the president are also greater than
those of the President of the United States. This is shown
by one law in particular, which states that, under certain
circumstances, the Argentine President has the authority to
suspend constitutional guarantees by declaring a state of
siege. This is a modified form of martial law which suspends
the personal liberties guaranteed by the Bill of Rights and
enables the President to rule as a dictator by presidential
decrees instead of legislation. A power such as this overthrows
the whole machinery of democracy except the civil courts, and
these are not permitted to pass judgment on the Presidents
actions. However, no president can serve two consecutive
terms; each term is six years.
SUMMARY
I have attempted, in one chapter, to give the most
important factors in this period of more than 300 years. The
facts which I have tried to bring out are that Argentina began
its independent life under the most unfavorable geographical,
political, social, and economic conditions which its people
had to fight and overcome before becoming a united nation.
Even after declaring their independence from Spain, it took
fifty tragic years before the first constitutional president
was elected in 1862. This is only 82 years ago, and in the
life of a nation 82 years are but a brief span. Moreover,
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one must remember that the people of Argentina are Latin and that
the people of Buenos Aires and the people of the interior, that
is, the "Portenos" and the "Criollos" , are not working in har-
mony. The great power of the president, which has been men-
tioned, has been abused and is still being abused today by
President Ramirez in suoh a way that he enjoys the position
of a dictator.

Section II
.Argentine Industry and Finance
Basis of the National Wealth
The basis of the national wealth and prosperity of
Argentina is preponderantly agricultural. This concentration
of economic activity results, of necessity, in a large volume
of foreign trade. A relatively small number of agricultural
products is exported to pay for a diversified list of imports.
Such simplicity in the national economy has been excessive and
such a concentration of activity in a small group of related
products is a bad risk. (1) The country* s entire economic life
has hinged upon the export trade. All branches of the national
economy have been organized to promote that trade and its
corollary,- the import trade.
Agriculture
Argentina has an area of about 670,251,120 acres of
which approximately 41$ is pasture land, 32% woodland, and 11%
cultivated. (2) In 1895 Argentina only had 12 million acres
under cultivation. By 1913 it had increased to 57 million and
in 1927 to 59 million. There are about 68 million acres under
cultivation at the present.
The agricultural census of June 1937 showed
439,874 farm and ranches of which 164,871 were operated by
owners; 197,174 by tenants; and 77,829 under special arrange-
ment s . ( 3
)
(1) Peters, H. E. , "The Foreign Debt of the Argentine Republic"
Page 50
(2) Statesman's Year Book, 1943, Page 705
(3) Statesman's Year Book, 1943, Page 705

*31
The distribution of livestock for the same year was
as follows:
Table III
Livestock Census July 1, 1957
Cattle 33,100,512
Horses 8,527,181
Mules and Asses 905,041
Sheep 43,790,166
Goats 4,875,990
Pigs 3,975,716
Source: Statesman^ Year Book, 1943, Page 705
As will be described in more detail in Chapter III,
one of the major trends in agricultural- production and exports
in recent years has been the shift from pastoral to agricultu-
ral products.
Industry
The industrialization of Argentina has gone through
two important stages of development. In the half century prior
to World War I Argentina was considered as an excellent example
of a country whose economy consisted of the exchange of raw
materials for the manufacturers of Europe (and to a small, but
increasing degree, of the United States). There was conside-
rable industrial development in certain lines, particularly in
the processing of foodstuffs, and also in the manufacture of
certain articles of oommon use such as, furniture, shoes, cheap
cotton cloth, soap and toilet preparations, cigarettes, wine

and beer. In comparison to the volume of pastoral and agri-
cultural production and export, it was relatively unimpor-
tant. (1)
During World War I, however, the manufacture of many-
articles developed rapidly, due to Europe* s inability (as well
as that of the United States) to supply them. Following the
war, some of these new industries were liquidated, but others
continued and were even expanded. The war also brought home to
Argentina for the first time the handicaps of relying upon other
countries for many of the necessities and conveniences.
Effect of the Depression
The second important stage in industrialization was
due primarily to the world crisis which broke in 1930. The de-
pression all but paralyzed the flow of foreign trade and immigra
tion bringing about the devaluation of agricultural products as
a result of increasing difficulties in placing these products
in world markets, In Argentina the lack of currency exchange
resulted in the violent devaluation of the peso in relation to
foreign currency, some times as much as 40$, thus, sky-rocket-
ing the prices of foreign made articles. The purchase of these
articles was made still more difficult due to the increase in
custom tariffs of 10% added by the government for fiscal rea-
sons. (2)
The situation was favorable for the installation of
new industries and the expansion of existing ones. A strong
(1) Wythe, George, "Manufacturing Developments in Argentina",
Trade Information Bulletin #820
(2) Llorens, E. "War Influence on Argentine Industry and Econ-
omy", Comments on Argentina Trade, Vol.23, No. 2, Page 20

-33-
influx of foreign capital was added to the national capitalists
who were timidly beginning to invest in these new industries.
The industrial development in the ten years from
1930 to 1939 was extremely fast. The number of persons therein
rose rapidly absorbing the normal increase in population and
the small flow of immigration. This eliminated unemployment
which appeared only as a limited scale for a relatively short
period. The pinch was only felt in the country principally in
the grain growing industry.
Production of Argentine manufacture is in gr4at va-
riety and in addition to those already mentioned on page 31,
it also includes woolens, silk textiles, vegetable oils, and
tobacco. Leather tanning materials, fabricated iron and steel
products, ceramic products, glass cement, furniture, paper,
electrical appliances, tires and rubber products are also pro-
duced domestically. The assembling of automobiles is also an
important industry. Approximately four out of five cars and
three out of four trucks solfl in Argentina are assembled with-
in the country. Manufacturing in the foodstuffs group is most
important; metal manufactures are in second place, and textiles,
third. Textile production has increased significantly in re-
cent years. 1941 estimates show that 85$ of the woolen cloth,
60% of the iinen, and 40% of cotton cloth consumed were do-
mestically produced. (1)
TO "Olson, T.R. and Hickman, C.A., MPan American Economics" ,flage31
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World War II
The effects of the crisis had not yet passed when the
present war broke out. The immediate consequences on Argentine
economy are similar to those of the depression. The consequen-
ces are the rise in cost of foreign manufactured articles and
the closing of traditional markets for the surplus harvest.
This again has boosted industrial development and increased the
diversification of agricultural products. A new factor con-
tributed to make the advance more pronounced: -the marketing
abroad of manufactured products. This began in a small way
during the war with such articles as electric ice-boxes, in-
candescent lamps, electrical equipment, woven wool, medicines
and metal articles. (1)
In the past three years (since 1939) there has been
an increase in exports of industrial products in significant
quantities to American countries and to the Union of South
Africa. These are mainly oils, wines and other beverages, me-
dicinal products, portland cement, wool and cotton spun and
woven goods, hats, felt, soap, fctearo and tartarian acids, me-
tal articles, buttons, radio and radio equipment. The value
of these exports expanded from 10 million pesos im 1938 to 265
million pesos in 1942. (2)
In the space of three years from 1939 to 1942 the
man power employed in the plants increased about 100,000;
workers and employers drew 250,000,000 pesos more in salaries
(1) Llorens, E.
,
Op.Cit. Page 22
(2) Ibid, Page 22

than were previously paid (an increase of more than 23%).
Table 17
Argentine Industrial Development
Salaries Value
Year
Personnel
Employed
Paid of
( In millions of
Production
Pesos
)
1914 383,508 * 1,823
1935 526,495 739 3,265
1937 642,792 948 4,704
1939 688,658 1,065 5,127
1940 704,045 1,077 5,327
1941 740,000 1,080 *
1942 780,000 1,320 *
*No figures available
Source: Llorens, E #
,
Op. Cit, Page 22
Meanwhile agriculture went through a critical period
due to the impossibility of finding markets for the corn, wheat,
and linseed surpluses. This, naturally, resulted in a drop in
price. A relief was found in the purchase of the harvests by
the government, in the successive years from 1939 (which called
for the investment of more than one billion pesos) and in the
diversification of the production. The continued purchase by
Great Britain of meat sustained the meat industry, thus, its
prosperity compensated for the sag in agriculture.
Thus, in general since 1930, due to the World Crisis
and the present war, the growth of agriculture has stagnated
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while there has been an accelerated increase in industrial pro-
ducts which has taken care of internal consumption and in many
lines has superseded some imported articles and has enabled the
export of others.
Beginning in 1943, however, certain difficulties
have cropped up which have dimmed the general picture of opti-
mism and prosperity of 1942. Important industrial sectors
found their operation curtailed through lack of raw materials.
As the war production plans of the nations which furnish them
increase and fuels are further curtailed they are becoming more
and more difficult or absolutely impossible to procure. Effects
of the shortage of fuels and lubricants, in relation to the
Governments plans for reinforcing the domestic industrial si-
tuation, have resulted in the creation of the National Depart-
ment of Power with fer-reaching authority. The decree esta-
blishing the Department states that it will be given the pro-
duction, distribution and consumption of all fuels and electric
energy and power existing in the country irrespective of their
origin or ownership. (1)
As a result employment of workers is rising more
slowly . Neverthless the picture in general is promising, par-
ticularly if compared with the extraordinary difficulties be-
setting the majority of the warring countries.
Thus, the industrial development has spared the
country from the grave problem of unemployment during the c±i-
sis which began in 1930 and has prepared the nation to meet
(1) Foreign Commerce Weekly, December 11, 1943
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the difficult situations arising out of the present war.
Argentina has "been able because of this to main-
tain the same standard of living and actually is enjoying a
period of prosperity.
Post-War Outlook
The expansion of "light" industrial activity has
taken place despite the uncertainty of the post-war period.
It is not protected by adequate legislation from the strong
competition and dumping which will undoubtedly ensue. However,
there are Government trends to adopt legal steps that may be
necessary to avoid repetition of the neglect of 1919 and the
succeeding years when large numbers of industries couldn't
survive.
The prospects of Argentina developing heavy indus-
try is not encouraging, since she lacks the necessary ores.
Argentina has developed a small but important industry in the
remelting, recasting, and reworking of iron and steel which
are accrued largely from the scrap metal supplies of the rail-
roads. But large quantities of iron and steel are imported in
raw or semi-finished form for domestic fabrication.
Since Argentina's industrial expansion is largely
dependent on these raw materials which have to be imported,
it is difficult to evaluate the position that Argentine in-
dustrialization will play. Therefore, she will be greatly
affected by the policy or policies of the great powers or
group of powers once World War II is over.

-38
Immigration Policy
In the preamble of Argentina's constitution there
was a provision that: the Federal government shall encourage
European Immigration; and it shall not restrict, limit, or im-
pose taxation of any kind upon the entry into Argentina terri-
tory of aliens coming to it for the purpose of tilling the
soil, improving industries or introducing and teaching scien-
ces and arts.
Bartolome Mitre (1862-68), Argentina's first presi-
dent, devoted much of his administration to attracting Euro-
pean immigrants. Mitre granted colonization concessions to
agents who went to Europe in search of settlers. The govern-
ment built a large Immigrant's Hotel in the port of Buenos
Aires where they were kept at government expense until they
were located in the interior. During the administration se-
veral agricultural colonies were founded and 100,000 immigrants
entered the country. (1) By 1928 there was a total of
5,740,000. (2)
In the period 1921-1929, Argentine Immigration
showed an average net of 94,250 per year. However, when the
Conservatives came into power in 1930, restrictive measures
were put into effect with the object of improving the type of
immigrant. (3) Only 25,000 immigrants entered both in 1937
(1) White, J.W., Op. Git. Page 118
(2) Olson, H.E. and Hickman, C.A., Op. Cit. Page 175
(3) South American Handbook, 1941, Page 120
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and 1938, and by 1939 the total had dropped to 4,671.
Immigration has been of importance in the development
of Argentina. With the restrictions on immigration and the de-
cline in the birth rate it is evident that Argentina f s popula-
tion will increase very slowly. Industry, as a result, will not
develop as rapidly as it could and the internal market for agri-
cultural products will not be increased to any appreciable de-
gree, (l)
Merchant Marine
Argentina had never been a maritime nation and had no
overseas merchant marine. Argentina always depended on the ship-
ping of the nations which sent vessels to the River Plate to
load grains and meats. In August 1941, Argentina purchased from
Italy sixteen steamers including the passenger liner, Principes-
sa Maria, which had taken refuge in Argentine ports upon the out-
break of the war. (2) This was the inception of a merchant ma-
rine for Argentina.
Argentina has not wanted a merchant marine merely to
avoid paying large sums in freight, since this would also reduce
foreign ability to buy her products. Primarily, she desires a
domestic fleet to accentuate economic progress in remote parts
of the nation such as southern Argentina* Moreover, this new
merchant marine might establish trade with the other South
American countries such as Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, and Cuba,
(1) See Chapter I, Pageio
(2) White, J.W.
,
Op.Cit. Page 229
i
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permitting the sale of Argentina's agricultural, pastoral and
industrial products among these countries. As of August 7, 1943
Argentina's merchant marine had a total of 38 ships with a gross
tonnage of 200,000. (1)
Railway
As of June 30, 1942 there was a total of 28,406 miles
of which 7,941 miles belonged to the state. (2) Over 20,000
miles are British-owned. Even though Argentina' ranks first of
all the Latin American countries in total mileage, there is still
a shortage of railway and because of this the only rail link
between Buenos Aires and the southern part of Argentina is
through coastal shipping. (3)
Roads
Argentina with 253,000 miles of road is first among
all Latin American countries. Although Argentina is considered
one of the best served. parts of Latin America in respect to
road service, it has only 10% of its total mileage open to
traffic in all kinds of weather. (4) Construction of roads
and bridges in Argentina are under Government control and a
plan calling for construction up to the year 1947 is, under way.
A total of 15,649,810 pesos (approximately $4,195,450) were
expended for road construction during 1943. (5)
(1) Olson, H.E.and Hickman, O.A., Op.Cit. Page 155
(2) Statesman 1 s Year Book, 1943, Page 706
(3) Olson, H.E.and Hickman, C.A., Op. Cit. Page 183
(4) South American Handbook, 1942, Page 130
(5) Foreign Commerce Weekly, 1943, Vol. 13, No. 13

-Argentina is building up its transportation facilities
but, as yet, they are not developed to the extent which is ne-
cessary for a country of its size. Before -Argentina can obtain
its rightful position among the nations its transportation sys-
tem must be augmented greatly in order to tap all of Argentina's
rich resources.
Communications
Argentina has a total of 4,266 post offices and
79,565 miles of telegraph lines. It has 1,375,000 miles of
telephone wires with 308,000 subscribers. (1) Wireless tele-
phony between Buenos Aires, Chile, the United States and Europe
is in general.use. There are forty-four broadcasting stations
and about 250,000 receiving sets. (2)
Mineral Wealth
Although Argentina has a variety of minerals, deposits
of most of them are either poor or inaccessible, except for
petroleum. Mineral production in 1941 was valued at
170,484,000 pesos, of which petroleum accounted for
106,291,000 pesos. (3)
Argentine Bank s
Argentina has a modern banking system which compares
well with any in the world. The institutions that form the
system are: The Central Bank: the Bank of the Argentine Nation;
(1) Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939, Fage 167
(2) South American Handbook, Page 709
(3) Statesman's Year Book, 1943, Page 706
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the National Mortgage Bank; the Provincial, National and For-
eign Commercial Banks; and the Municipal Loan Banks.
The Banco Central de la Republica Argentina was cre-
ated by law number 12,155 of March 1935 for the period of for-
ty years with an authorized capital of 30 million pesos divided
in 30,0.00 shares of 1,000 pesos. The subscribed capital is
20,000,000 of which 10,000,000 pesos were subscribed by the
government and the balance by the Provincial, National and
Foreign banks having a subscribed capital of 1,000,000 pesos
The objectives of the Bank are: (1)
a. To concentrate sufficient reserves
to moderate the effects of fluctua-
tions in exports and investments of
foreign capital on currency, credit,
and commerce activity in order to
maintain the value of the currency.
b. To regulate the volume of credit
and means of payment , adapting them
to the actual volume of trade.
c. To promote the liquidity and
sound functioning of bank credit,
and to apply the provision esta-
blished in the banking laws for
the inspection, control, and ad-
ministration of banks.
d. To act as financial agent and
counsellor of the Government in
foreign or internal credit opera-
tion and on the issue and service
of public loans.
The bank has proven to be very successful for since
its founding to the end of 1S42, the National Government pro-
(1) Comments on Argentina Trade, "Banking in Argentina", Vol. 23,
No. 3, Page 44
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fit from participations have totaled 24,600,890 pesos apart
from dividends of 3,791,667 pesos. (1)
The Bank of the Province of Buenos Aires which was
founded in 1835 is the second largest bank in the country,
>It now has 101 branches throughout the province. Of great im-
portance also are the Municipal Loan Banks that are owned and
operated by their respective Municipalities. Then, there comes
the National Mortgage Bank, an institution formed and closely
controlled by the state, to make available short and long term
mortgage loans at low interest rates for certain classes of
borrowers, Its aim is chiefly to provide funds for the small
borrowers for building houses, or the development of cattle ran-
ches and fruit farms. Large amounts are advanced to facilitate
the division of large tracts of land into medium sized holdings.
The foreign banks are the largest and most active of
the private establishments. They are dominated by the great
English institutions: the Bank of London and the River Flate,
the Bank of London and Brazil, the British Bank of South Ameri-
ca, and the Anglo-South American Bank. There are also German,
French, and Italian banks, specializing in the commercial needs
of their respective countrymen; but they are of comparatively
small size. (2)
(1) Comments on Argentina Trade, "Banking in Argentina", Vol.23
No. 3, Page 46
(2) Peters, H.E., Op. Git. Page 57

-44-
Foreign Interests and Loans
.Argentina was one of the first countries of South
America to attract the foreign investor. Government loans
began to be floated in London as early as 1824, and after 1850
British private investments became of increasing significance. (l)
Over the 1910-1934 period British investment in Argentina in-
creased from 1,475,000,000 to 2,285,000,000 gold pesos. (2)
British investments in Argentina in 1939 totaled nearly
#2,000,000,000 more than half of which is invested in rail-
ways.
The other great trading powers of Europe have also
invested heavily in Argentina. France for a long time ranked
second as an investor in Argentina, her investment being sta-
bilized at 410,000,000 gold pesos in 1934. Beginning about
1927, however, French investment in Argentina was surpassed by
United States 1 investments by 90,000,000 gold pesos. (3)
Germany has been the other leading European foreign
investor in Argentina, ranking third up to 1927 and then fourth
and investing 200,000,000 gold pesos in 1910 and 315,000,000 in
1934. French, German, Dutch and Belgian capital in Argentina
now aggregate to about a billion dollars. (4) The French
funds have been invested in government securities, railways,
(1) Haring, C.H.
,
"Argentina and the United States" Page 50
(2) Phelps, V.L. ,0p. Git. Page 246
(3) Olson and Hickman, Op. Cit. Page 98
Mso see Phelps, V.L., Op. Cit., Page 246
(4) Haring, G.H.
,
Op. Cit., Page 50
? C t
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and ports, whereas German capital has been focused on land and
cattle companies as well as on commerce.
Prior to the first World War, United States 1 invest-
ment in Argentina was of relatively small importance, only ag-
gregating $40,000,000 in 1915. By 1927 the United States had
passed France as the second ranking foreign investor in Argen-
tina, By 1940 United States' direct investment in Argentina
was $387,945,000, and portfolio investment at the end of 1940
was 1191,000,000. This was a decline of $52,055,000 over the
total of $611,000,000 that was invested in 1929. (1) It is
interesting to note that United States* investment in Argentina
from 1950 through 1933 declined more rapidly and extensively
than any other foreign investment. Indeed the investment totals
of most of the European investors actually increased during the
period.
The Argentine national government enjoys the distinc-
tion of being the only one in Latin America, excepting Venezue-
la, which has not defaulted on any of its foreign debt obliga-
tions. However, investors in Argentine provinces and municipa-
lities were less fortunate. Only the city of Buenos Aires and
the provinces of Cordoba and Tucuman continued to meet their
public debt service. The rest were in default, but, in 1934
the federal government assumed responsibility for the outstand-
ing provisional obligations held abroad. (2) As of June 30,1940
(1) Olson and Hickman, Op. Cit. Page 103
(2) Haring, G.H. Op. Pit. Page 55
c5
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the total bonded and floating debt of the Nation, Provinces
and Municipalities amounted to 7,724,534,647 paper pesos. (1)
For the year 1943 total revenues and expenditures
balanced at 1,970,400,000 pesos or $580,700,000. The total
revenues for the year 1944 have been estimated by the Argentine
Government at 2,682,200,000 pesos ($719,100,000) and expendi-
tures at 2, 325, 400, OCX) pesos ($623,300,000) thus, forecasting
a surplus of 356,800,000 pesos or $95,800,000. The estimated
revenue for 1944 is approximately 36$ more, while the estimated
expenditures have increased 18$. (2)
Economically, Argentina's outlook is very favorable
but conditions during war are quickly subject to change. Of
more importance is the position that the Argentine Nation will
have among the other nations once the immediate effects of the
war have passed.
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Git. Page 319
(2) Foreign Commerce Weekly, "Argentina-Economic Conditions",
March 18, 1944
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Argentine Trade Developments
The Growth of Argentine Commerce
Although .Argentina's foreign trade was begun some
four hundred years ago, its real development started about 1875,
The value of Argentina's trade during the fifty-year period
following 1875 increased eighteenfold, from $100, 000,000 in
1875 to $1,820,000 in 1925, thus, placing Argentina among the
first ten commercial nations of the world. (1) Beginning in
1875, Argentina's foreign trade may be divided into periods
designated as follows:
1875-1897 Pastoral Period
During this period, Argentina was a pastoral country
in which the sheep and cattle industries furnished most of the
exports of the country, approximately two-thirds, until as late
as 1894. The exports exceeded the imports throughout this peri-
od except from 1880 to 1890. (2) This has been called the
"immature debtor" stage in Argentina's economic development du-
ring which foreign capital was being used chiefly for railroad
construct iott. The railroad construction, of course, opened new
territories and connected the interior with the river fronts
and the seaboard. This combined with the hundreds of thousands
of immigrants, (466,000 during 1887-1889) who nearly all settled
on the pampas, paved the way for the expansion of agricultural
exports which played a very important part in the export trade
(1) Jones, C.F., "Commerce of South America", Page 37
(2) Phelps, L.P. , "The International Economic Position of
Argentina", Page 125
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of Argentina during the closing years of the nineteenth century
and which continued until 1929.
In 1891, a severe financial panic spread over Argen-
tina and there was a rapid decline in imports, bringing about
an overturn in the trade balance.
1897-1915
Starting in 1897, exports increased rapidly with the
added impetus of farm products which increased from 37% of the
total in 1824, to 48% in 1903, and 58% in 1912. Imports which
were relatively constant between 1897 to 1902, increased rapidly
from 19Q2 to 1914, exceeding exports in 1911 when exports de-
clined that year. In short, exports and imports for this period
1897-1913, increased to almost $500,000,000 from $100,000,000. (1)
1914-1929
While trade during 1897-1913 had increased about five-
fold, during 1914-1929 the actual increase was just two-fold.
However, the general trend of increase which began about 1900
was maintained. During this period, the trade shows wider
fluctuations than ever before. An excessive rainfall during
the wh«at and corn harvest seasons in 1913-1914 reduced the ex-
port of corn and wheat to about one half that of the preceding
year. The low corn yields of 1916 and 1917, the small wheat
crop of 1917, the withdrawal of German and other shipping from
South American services, and the general disorganization of
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Oit. Page 126
(2) Table XXII, Page 79

world trade, augmented by a large increase in freight rates
from Argentina to Europe, kept the exports of 1915-1917 at a
level only a little above that of 1913 and reduced the imports
substantially, (1)
Great demands for food in northwestern Europe in 1917
to 1980, supplemented by organization of world shipping and a-
bundant harvests of corn, wheat and flaxseed, doubled Argen-
tina's trade in three years. Thus, in 1920, the exports reached
approximately the billion-dollar mark, while imports totaled
#836,223,000. In 1921, trade decreased by 25%, due to poor
wheat and corn crops, the deflation of overexpanded animal in-
dustries, and the financial crisis which followed the World
War. From 1922 to 1929, exports were greater than imports by
nearly $400,000,000 even though the imports of 1922, f 23, '25,
and 1926 were more than the exports. (2)
1929-1942
From 1929 to 1939, exports exceeded imports except in
1930 and in 1938; in. 1939 exports were $393,293,000 as compared
to $334,583,000 for imports. The value of imports exceeded ex-
ports for 1940 by 70,000,000 pesos. For 1942 exports were
about 500,000,000 pesos more than imports. (3)
The Export Trade
The commercial development of Argentina has been due
to the remarkable expansion in pastoral and agricultural pro-
ducts. Range anil farm products account for about 95% of Argen-
(1) Table XXII, Page 79
(2) Ibid
(3) Ibid
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tina*s total exports* (1) This, of course, is natural because
Argentina lacks the essentials for large manufacturing indus-
tries but is a new country rich in agricultural resources.
Thus, Argentina f s imports have consisted almost entirely of a
great variety of manufactured articles and fuels
Although the products of the farm and of the range
have dominated the exports, the two groups have not been of
equal importance. Their relative importance has changed as
well as the component parts in each group. Agricultural pro-
ducts account for an increasingly greater percentage of the
total, having increased from 56% of the total exports in the
pre-war period (1911-1913) to about 62% in recent years. In
the same interval, pastoral products have declined from a pre-
war average of 40% to an average of 33% in the three-year period
(1932-1934).
Table V
Argentine Exports
of
Agricultural and Animal Products
(1937-1939)
1937 1938 1939
(Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
Total Agricultural Products §488,100 #207,713 #191,242
Total Animal Products 238,668 199,590 172,169
Other Exports 51.008 30.619 18.882
Total Exports $757,776 #437,922 $393,293
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
(1) See Table VI, Page 51
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For the years 1937, 1938, and 1939 these same values
expressed in percentages are as follows:
Table VI
Argentine Major Exports
(expressed in Percentages)
1937 1938 1939
Total Agricultural Products 64.0% 47.5% 50.0%
Total Animal Products 32.6% 45.6% 44.0%
Other Exports 3.4% 7.9% 6.0%
Total Exports 100. % 100. % 100. %
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Agricultural and Animal Products still account for
approximately 95% of total exports. In the last two years there
has been an increase in Animal Products with a resulting decrease
in Agricultural Products.
From Table VII it can be seen that eight products
account for nearly all of the exports of the animal industries.
However, Beef, Wool, and Hides and Skins, account for nearly
80% of the total of these products.

Table VII
Exports of Selected Animal Products
(In Thousnads of U.S. Dollars)
1937 1938 1939
Wool $55,477 $47,078 $40, 668
Hides and Skins 58,922 33,489 29,668
Mutton 11,833 10,573 8,814
Beef 65,286 62,538 51,964
Butter and Cheese 3,558 3,451 3,514
Casein 3,164 1,113 1,394
Tallow and Grease 9. 773 4.819 4,752
Total |201,913 $163,061 C104,720
Total Animal Products 238, 668 199,590 172,169
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Values of Wheat, Flour, Corn and Linseed as can be
seen by Table VIII averaged approximately 70$ of the total
agricultural products in 1937 while in 1938 and 1939 it was
over 80%. Thus, along with Beef, Wool, Hides and Skins they
accounted for 72% of the total exports of Argentina in 1939.
Table VIII
Exports of Major Agricultural Products
(In Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
1937 1938 1939
Wheat and Flour $161,376 $60,549 $70,975
Corn 196,239 • 56,449 50,643
Linseed 90,266 56, 658 42,558
Total $347,881 $173,656 $164,173
Total Agr. Prod. 488,100 207,713 191,742
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939

Wool
Before the turn of the century, wool exports led all
other commodities amounting to 23% of all exports as late as
1903. In 1912, it amounted to only about 12% and for the pe-
riod 1932-34, the percentage was only 5.9%. (l)The value of
wool exports for the years 1937-1939 are as follows:
Table IX
Argentine Wool Exports
(In Thousaads of U.S. Dollars)
1957 1958 1959
Wool $-55,477 $47,078 $40,668
Total Exports #757,776 $437,922 $393,293
Ratio to Total 7.3% 10.7% 10.3%
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
During the early years large areas of cheap, tempe-
rate pasture lands and the relatively small population of Ar-
gentina, together with the increasing demand for wool for the
textile mills of northwestern Europe, supplied the great impe-
tus for the development of an extensive sheep industry on a
gigantic scale. Woo3b could be easily prepared and transported
to market without too much wear and tear, even though trans-
portation facilities were not good.
However, the decline of wool in the trade of Argen-
tina has been due to the decrease in number of sheep in the
expanding cereal belts of the country. In the Provinoe of
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Git. Page 137
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Buenos Aires alone, there were, in 1895 about 52,000,000 sheep,
and in 1922 only about 13,900,000. (1) With the decrease of
sheep raising on the pampas, there has been an increase in the
expansion of sheep raising in the frontier region of Southern
-Argentina,
In 1895, there were 74,000,000 sheep in Argentina;
in 1908, 67,000,000; and in 1922, 36,000,000. (2) However,
in the last livestock census, June 1937, the number of sheep
totaled 43,833,000 which is an increase of nearly 8 million.
Also, as can be seen on page 53, the value of exports of wool
to the total exports amounts to 10 percent.
Hides and Skins
The trend in the exports of hides and skins is simi-
lar to that of wool during the early commercial development of
Argentina. They were produced cheaply, handled fairly easily
and transported long distances without any degree of deterio-
ration. During the colonial period, animals were slaughtered
for their skins, tallow was derived from some of the carcasses
but most were left for the dogs and buzzards. However, with
the development of the manufacture of dried and salt beef (ta-
sajo), hides became in part a by-product, and later, when the
frozen-meat and chilled-meat industry was established, hides
and skins, except fpr goatskins and horsehides, became more
and more a by-product.
(1) Jones, C.F., Op. Cit. Page 43
(2) Ibid, Page 43

For the period 1922-1924, the value of -Argentine ex-
ports ofl hides and skins was 11$ of her total exports, during
1927-1929 they were 7.4$ and for the period 1932-1934, they
were 5.9$. For the years 1937-1939 hides and skins again in-
creased to approximately 7%.
Table X
Argentine Exports of Hides and Skins
(In Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
1957 1958 1959
Total Hides and Skins $52,922 ; 33,489 $29,614
Total Exports $757,776 $437,922 #393,293
Average 7% 7.7% 7.9%
Source :Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Table XI
Breakdown of .Argentine Exports of Hides & Skins-1959
Volume
(1000 lbs)
Value
($1,600)
295,650 $22, 323
29,630 2,402
34,211 2,218
9,828 461
5,132 866
2,870 1,344
Book, 1939
Cattle, Salted
Cattle, Dried
Sheep and Lambskins
Horsehides
Goat and Kid Skins
Wild Animal Fur Skin
Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom
were the leading buyers of Argentina 's cattle hides, taking
some 75% of the total. France used to purchase 70$ of the
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sheep skins. The United States imported most of the goat and
kid skins and Foland and Italy used to be the chief purchasers
of horsehides. (1)
Frozen Mutton
Due to the large numbers of sheep, the comparative
ease of handling them in the early slaughtering plants, and
the changes in the animal industries of the Pampa, frozen mut-
ton made up; a considerable part of the early trade in meats.
Prior to 1902, the volume of frozen mutton exports exceeded
that of beef, averaging 60,000 tons annually. Although it con-
tinued to increase for the next ten years, the much more rapid
growth of beef exports was greater than the increased volume
of frozen mutton which was then averaging 75,000 tons. (2)
For the decade following 1912, the exports averaged
52,000 tons, or only two-thirds of the amount shipped during
the previous decade. This was due primarily to four factors;
(1) the indiscriminate slaughtering of animals in the preceding
period, (2) the rise in the price of wool, (3) the natural de-
crease in the overstocked ranges in the more arid parts of the
country, and (4) a greater emphasis on beef exports for war
purposes. After World War I, frozen mutton exports increased
tremendously, reaching a peak of 92,000 tons in 1925 and fluc-
tuating between 67,000 and 83,000 tons until 1933. In 1933,
1934, and 1935 the exports totaled 63,000, 49,000 and 50,000
(1) Phelps, L.P. ,0P. Cit. Page 138
(2) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op.Oit. Page 137
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tons respectively. For 1937, 1958 and 1939, exports were 57,000,
52,500 and 60,375 tons approximately, with a value in United
States' dollars of $11,833,000, #10,573,000 and $8,814,000 re-
spectively. Though exports in 1939 increased, the value decreased.
From the exports, up through 1939, one can predict that exports
of frozen mutton will continue to average between 55,000 to
65,000 tons and the greatest fluctuation that may rise will be
due to either a change in the price of wool or that of mutton.
Beef
Beef, other than salted and jerked beef, unlike mutton,
became significant only after 1900, amounting to £5,000 metric
tons, or about one half the exports of mutton for that year.
Fresh meat exports date from the introduction of refrigeration
about 1880, which revolutionized the entire future of the anim-
al industries in Argentina. The exports of 1925 compared to
those of 1900 show a great increase. The figures were 1,490,000,000
pounds in 1925 and 55,000,000 pounds in 1900 or approximately
a ratio of 27:1. (1) In 1914 exports of frozen beef totaled
300,000 tons and due to the expanded needs of the war it reached
approximately to 500,000 tons in 1918, the highest figure ever
attained. By 1922 frozen beef had decreased to 160,000 tons and
beginning in this year exports of frozen beef were rapidly sup-
planted by chilled beef, which now averages about 80% of the
fresh beef exports of Argentina. Practically all of the chilled
beef was bought by the English.
(1) Jones, C.F., Op. Cit. Fage 48
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Table XII
Argentine Beef Exports
1957-1939
Quantity Value
(1,000 lbs.) ($1,000)
Chilled Frozen Chilled Frozen
1937 770,466 203,072 55,881 9,405
1938 754,912 226,481 52,125 10,413
1939 779,386 243,710 42,496 9,468
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
It is interesting to note that with the expansion of
Argentina* s beef beginning in 1900 there was a corresponding de-
cline in beef exports from the United States. In fact by 1914
Argentina had replaced the United States as the chief source of
Europe's beef supply. In recent years, Argentina has furnished
more than 50% of the world's beef exports. Of more interest is
the fact that American firms dominate the meat-packing industry
of Argentina, controlling about 60%. (1)
Argentine beef has attained its dominant factor in
world trade because of several natural important factors. The
excellent native grasses of the Pampa were adequate as long as
the export products were hides, skins, tasajo, and tallow. How-
ever, with the exportation of frozen beef to the European mar-
kets, it was found that in order to compete with the United States
and other beef-producing countries it would be necessary to pro-
vide feed for fattening the animals or for tiding them over for
(1) Jones, C.F.
,
Op. Cit. Page 55
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a period of drought or of scarce grass during the winter, Alfal-
fa has proven to be the important factor since it has made pro-
fitable the use of million of acres of land that would otherwise
be mostly unproductive. It produces beef which can compare with
beef from the United States. Cattle which have been raised in
the Southwest and in the Chaco are sent to the alfalfa fields,
which are near slaughtering plants, to be fattened. In winter,
oats are used as feed, and because the winters are short and
mild, open grazing is possible which makes the building of shel-
ters unnecessary. Besides this prime factor in the production
of cheap but excellent beef there is another great factor and,
that is, that the great slaughtering plants and ocean transpor-
tation are within two hundred and fifty miles of the best cattle
country.
Besides chilled and frozen beef, Argentina also exports
canned and salted or jerked meats, the exports of which in 1958
were #13,999,000 and $885,000 respectively. For 1939 they were
$12,732,000 and $516,000.
Butter and Cheese
The development of dairying has accompanied the expan-
sion of the meat industry in Argentina. Between 1898 and 1916
the exports of butter fluctuated between 2,000,000 and 12,000,000
pounds. Butter and cheese exports expanded rapidly during
World War I, reaching a total of 20,000 and 10,000 tons respec-
tively, in 1919. By 1925 most of this market for cheese exports
was lost, due to the recovery of European producers from the
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effeots of World *ar I. Butter exports increased in volume until
1925, when they totaled 33,000 tons. From 1924-32 inclusive,
the average annual volume was 24,000 tons. In 1934, the butter
exports declined to only 8,000 tons. (1)
Table XIII
Argentine Butter and Cheese Exports
1937-1939
Quantity Value
(1,000 lbs.) ($1,000)
But t er Cheese Butter Cheese
1937 19,359 3,267 3,066 492
1938 16,173 4,363 2,785 686
1939 19,744 5,474 2,875 639
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Butter has been more stable in volume, however, in com-
parison to beef and mutton. The value of butter in 1939 was
approximately $191,000 less, although there was an increase of
145,000 tons. Cheese, for the three year period, has increased
steadily in volume and the value of the exports of 1939 is less
than 1938 by some 47,000, even though there was an increase in
volume of 1,111,000 in 1938.
Casein
.Another important factor of the dairy industry is ca-
sein, the annual exports of which increased from less than 3,000
tons in 1915 to 15,000 tons in 1925 and ranging from 14,000 to
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Cit. Page 139
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23,00 tons since that date. (1)
Table XIV
Argentine Exports of Casein
1957-1959
Quantity
(In Thousand pounds)
Value
(In U.S. Dollars)
$3,064,000
$1,113,000
1937 34,114
1938 29,436
1939 45,335 11,394,000
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Consistent as the other products of the animal indus-
tries the volume of casein for 1939 has increased by some
16,000,000 pounds and the value though greater than 1938 exceeds
it only by $281,000.
Products of the Farm
though the Pampa offered excellent means for the cultivation of
various crops. As late as 1870, wheat and flour were sent re-
gularly from southern Brazil to Buenos Aires. At this time only
1,000,000 acres were under cultivation. Within twenty-five years
the cultivated land had increased to 12,000,000 acres and in 1939
approximately 74,000,000 acres were under cultivation. (2)
between crops and pastoral products for the first place in the
(1) Phelps, L. P.
,
Op.Cit. Page 139
(2) Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Argentina imported foodstuffs for a long time, even
As has already been stated on page 48 the competition
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trade of Argentina did not become keen until about 1900. Up to
that time wool, hides, tallow, and meats led by a wide margin.
The only important farm product was wheat, which amounted to one
fourth the total exports in 1894. In 1904 the exports of farm
products exceeded those of the range and since then the diffe-
rence separating the two has increased. It is estimated that
283,000,000 acres are used as pasturage, however, commercially
Argentina is an agricultural country. The products of the farm
for 1937, 1938 and 1939 are 64, 47.5 and 50 percent of the va-
lue of the exports while the animal industries in the same
three years are 32.6, 45.6 and 44 percent.
Needless to state, the products of the farm, in con-
trast to the products of the animal industries, show more fre-
quent and more striking fluctuations. They depend on the irre-
gularity of good and bad seasons, and since the rainfall in the
heart of the cereal belt, although amply sufficient onthe average,
varies widely from year to year, losses from drought or exces-
sive rainfall result. Also, locust plagues which descend peri-
odically from the subtropical areas in the north and inadequate
storage facilities tend to increase the fluctuations. Moreover,
many of the cereal farmers come from immigrant stock and ope-
rate om a small scale with limited resources, a condition which
forces them to sell their crops almost immediately. In contrast
cattle and sheep raising is conducted mostly on a large scale
by men who can afford to store their wool and hides and delay
the slaughter of their herds until prices improve.
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Wheat and Flour
Wheat was the first important farm product to enter the
export trade. It was a product that was suited to pioneer condi-
tions and to the resources of the immigrant farmer with small
means. Also, in the nineties, the boom in the cattle business
caused many landowners to break up poor grassland in order to
seed it to alfalfa. The easiest method of accomplishing this
was to grow two crops of wheat and then leave the land sown with
alfalfa.
In 1898, 25,000,000 bushels of wheat and flour were ex-
ported. In thirty years exports increased to more than
150,000,000. (1) Wheat, which was the first cereal crop to be-
come important in Argentina, held first rank until 1935, when the
value of wheat and wheat flour was exceeded by corn. However, in
1938 and 1939, the value of wheat once again surpassed the value
of corn as the following figures show:
Table XV
Argentine Exports of Corn and Wheat
(including Wheat Flour)
1937-1959
1957 1958 1959
(Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
Wheat |155,950 $57,552 #68,629
Wheat Flour 5,446 5,197 2,246
Com 196,259 56,449 50,645
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
(1) Jones, C.F., Op. Cit. Page 60
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Oorn
Although all cereal exports tend to fluctuate greatly,
corn has fluctuated the most because of the fact that the aver*-
age rainfall is sufficient for a good crop only when properly
distributed. Corn has to have plenty of moisture in the grow-
ing season with dry weather in the harvest period, V/eather con-
ditions in the corn belt of Argentina are, however, usually the
reverse. During a dry spring, the growth of corn is retarded and
the locusts, millions of them, eat the young corn to the ground.
Moreover, if the harvest season is wet,, much of the corn spoils
in the fields or in the inadequate cribs in which it is stored.
Corn, like wheat, developed during the closing years
of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.
In 1900, exports were 28,000,000 bushels. (1) During World War
I, corn exports declined because of the scarcity of shipping
and high freight rates, as well as the increased demand for
wheat. The decline in the annual average of 3,256 thousand tons
in the period 1918-20 does not indicate the severity of this de-
cline as the following annual figures show:
Argentine Corn Exports
(thousands of tons)
1916 2,874
1917 894
1918 665
1919 2,485
1920 4,475 ( 2 )
(1) Jones, C.F., Page 62 Op. Cit.
(2) Phelps, L.P. Op. Cit. Page 142

After the War, the trend was steadily upward but with
marked annual variations. From 1925 to 1931, the annual volume
of corn exports fluctuated as muoh as 300 percent. In 1937,
corn exported amounted to 357,756,000 bushels while in 1938 only
104,017,000 bushels were exported. In 1939 exports didn't vary
much, increasing to 125,825,000 bushels. The value of corn has
been second in: the exports of Argentina. However, as has been
mentioned, the value of corn exceeded wheat and wheat flour in
1935, 1936 and 1937, but in 1938 and 1939 corn was second to
wheat again.
The United Kingdom normally purchases about one-half
of Argentina's corn exports, Belgium and the Netherlands about
one-sixth each with the remainder widely distributed, but prac-
tically all going to western Europe.
Linseed
Linseed ranks fourth in value among Argentina's export
averaging about 13 percent of the total value of exports. Argen
tine linseed averages about 72 percent of the world's exports
in. this commodity. In contrast to the three leading commodities
it is used in various industries instead of as a food product,
being in this respect like wool and hides, the fifth and sixth
commodities by value in the export trade.
Flax is produced almost entirely in the central part
of the Argentine cereal belt and conditions are favorable for
an abundant harvest. It is a suitable crop for new lands being
converted from fcather inferior pastures to excellent alfalfa

ranges or to crop lands, and it is used in rotation with wheat,
corn, and oats in the farming regions. It thrives very well
under the variable conditions of temperature, rainfall, sunshine
and drought, and, therefore, the crops show less marked fluctu-
ation than corn, wheat, or oats. In 1900 linseed exports amoun-
ted to 8,000,000 bushels, Argentine linseed exports increased
about three-fold from the pre-war average of 65,000 tons to an
annual average of 1,819,000 tons in the three year period 1927
to 1929. Notwithstanding rapidly falling prices, linseed export
increased from 1,170,000 tons in 1930 to 2,028,000 tons in 1952,
the all-time record. Marked declines in 1933 and 1934 however,
reduced the annual average for the three years, 1932-34 to
1,598,000 tons. For 1939 the value was half that of 1937.
Table XVT
Argentine Linseed Exports
1957-1939
Volume Value
(Thousand bushels) ($1,000)
1937 70,944 $90,266
1938 49,807 56,658
1939 46,581 42,558
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Oats
While oats occupy a secondary place in the crops of
Argentina, they flit well into the system of farming and cattle-
raising that has been developed, being rotated with wheat and
corn, They are used chiefly as feed for cattle and do not ere-

ate an active demand in the foreign markets. For the years of
1937, 1938, and 1939 exports in thousands of bushels were
27,792, 26,303, and 24,788, with a value of §8,084,000,
$7,087,000 and $4,040,000 respectively.
Minor Farm Products
Exports of barley, rye, and bran and pollards combined
amonnted to approximately $18,300,000, $12,800,000 and
$10,400,000 in the years 1937, 1938 and 1939. The volume of the
exports of these products for 1939 was greater than 1938 or
1937.
Forest Products
Although Argentina is a country deficient In timber re-
sources, its exports of forest products account for 2% of the
total exports. These consist entirely of quebracho extract and
logs. The quebracho, native to the subtropical forests of South
-America, is the most important source of tsnnin in the world.
The quebracho grows along the water-courses of northern Argen-
tina and therefore, can be loaded on the river and ocean boats
fromthe doors of the extract factories.
The quebracho export trade began about 1880 and Ger-
many was the chief consumer using tannin largely for the manu-
facture of sole leather. The trade developed slowly, and in
1916 exports amounted to $22,000,000. In 1924 they averaged
only $15,000,000. (1) For the years 1937, 1938 and 1939, they
(1) Jones, C.F., Op. Git. Page 70
rC
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amounted approximately to $5,000,000, #13,000,000 and #12,000,000.
The reason that exports have not increased to a great extent is
due to the mounting costs of cutting trees in the more inacces-
sible places and moving of logs to the riverside factories.
Imports
Urgent ina f s exports consist relatively of a few food-
stuffs and industrial raw materials. Her imports are mostly
manufactured goods of a wide variety. Argentina has no exten-
sive forests, no iron ore, and only a sprinkling of minerals
other than iron, and they are located in the arid mountain sec-
tion of the country. In the mineral regions, due to the scar-
city of water and fuel and inadequate transportation facilities,
mining has been greatly restricted. There are small deposits
of undeveloped high-grade bituminous coal in the territory of
Neuquen. For coal to reach Buenos Aires it must travel over
1,000 miles and so when it is shipped from Neuquen to Buenos
Aires by rail costs more in that city than does British coal.
The country has considerable potential water power
which, as yet, has not been developed because the power is too
far from the population centers to play a dominant part in the
development of manufacturing.
Although Argentina possesses valuable oil depesits in
the Comodoro Rivadavia and other fields, it must import great
quantities of fuels and lubricants. It is because of the neces-
sity of using foreign fuel that a high protective tariff has
been imposed by the Argentine government, for without the tariff
the manufacturing industries of the country could not compete
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with the cheaper and better imported commodities. Notwithstand-
ing this highly protective tariff, Argentina, besides iron and
steel products, has to import a considerable amount of textiles.
Textiles
Argentina* s domestic textile industry, aided by high
tariff duties, is increasing its output. Textile imports averaged
18.1$ of the total imports during the three year period 1932 to
1934, and 19.3$ in 1935. In 1939 textiles reached nearly 28$ of
imports. The increasing imports of yarns, particularly artifi-
cial silk (rayon) yarns, are witness to the increasing importance
of local textile manufacture.
Cotton goods account for nearly half the textile im-
ports, totaling over eight percent of all imports. They include
all types of cotton goods, from heavy duck and unbleached sheet-
ings to fancy voiles and cotton and silk mixtures. Before 1935
the United Kingdom dominated the trade, providing about half of
the total, but in 1935 Japan provided 28.4$ of cotton textiles
while the share of the United Kingdom declined to 37.8$. Italy
dropped to the third place from second with 16.1$. (1)
Woolen goods, which were approximately- one-third as
important as those of cotton in the import trade, have declined
in recent years. Woolen imports are of the better grades, while
domestic production supplies more of the cheaper fabrics. Eng-
land supplies high-grade men's suitings, while France dominates
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Cit. Page 147
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the marketsfor ladies' woolen dress goods, fine fancy woolen,
and mixed silk and woolen goods.
Other textile imports consist to a large degree of jute
bags and bagging practically all of which come originally from
India, They are used for grain bags and also to cover the frozen
and chilled meat carcasses which are shipped to Europe. More-
over, a large part of Argentina's grain crops still are trans-
ported to market in sacks, although, as has been mentioned in
Chapter I Page 7, efforts have been made to improve and expand
elevator and other storage facilities.
Iron and Steel Products
Argentina has been forced to import most of her iron
and steel products because her resources of iron ore and coal are
insufficient. This class of products includes everything from
frail wire goods to huge locomotives, railway cars and massive
combined harvester-threshers. However, under the protection of
high tariffs, increasing quantities of certain types of iron and
steel goods, such as structural steel, bolts, rivets, small ma-
chinery and some farm vehicles are being produced.
Imports of tron and steel products declined from
20,9$ of total imports for the period 1924-26 to 9% for the pe-
riod 1932-34, with a slight increase in 1935 to 10.9%, (1)
For 1942 and 1943, imports of iron and steel products averaged
nearly 14%.
The United States supplies about one-tenth of Argen-
(1) Phelps, L.P., Op. Cit. Page 153
<
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tina's imports of iron and steel products. 'Then it comes to
highly fabricated products of iron and steel, such as machinery,
the United States is first by a wide margin. Phelps, in his
book on Argentina states that this predominance of United States*
machinery is attributed to two factors: (1) the United States
occupies a superior competitive position in the manufacture of
many types of machinery which are particularly susceptible to
mass production- in other words, the United States occupies a
favorable position with respect to supply; (2) because of simi-
larity between certain aspects of the Argentine economy and that
of the United States, Argentina offers a market with an effective
demand for certain types of products which are produced on a
large scale for domestic consumption in the United States.
A relatively high and improving standard of living in
Argentina has created a market for greater number of comforts
and luxuries, in the production of which, the United States ex-
cells. Chief among these products are automobiles, including
accessories, office and household appliances. The United States
also supplies large ^uaniitiiS of mining machinery, particularly
oil-well equipment, and dominates the market for agricultural
machinery.
Agricultural Maohinery
The conditions in Argentina have been especielly fa-
vorable to the introduction and use of agricultural machinery.
Some of the favorable factors are: (1) level land and fertile
soil, free from rocks and boulders which facilitate the use of
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agricultural implements of all kinds; (2) small rural popula-
tion, fostering the use of all types of labor-saving machinery;
(3) relatively dry harvesting season which permits the use of
the large "combine " type of harvester-thresher; and (4) small
domestic production, due to lack of raw materials and power, as
well as labor and capital.
Due to the similarityof agricultural conditions in
both the United States and Argentine, it has been possible for
the United States* manufacturers to produce on a large scale
and undersell European manufacturers, whoee domestic markets
do not require the type of implements used in the extensive
type of agriculture practiced in Argentina and many parts of
the United States.
The exports of the United States and Canada (which
are largely the output of United States branch plants) supply
over 80$ of Argentina* s agricultural machinery. (1) The value
of major imports of agricultural machinery can be seen in
Table XVII for the years 1937 - 1939.
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Git. Page 155
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Table XVII
Ma.jor Imports of .Agricultural Machinery
1957-1959
Commodity Value
1957 1958 1959
(In Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
Farm Tractors 5,710 5,496 1,008
Harvesters 2,165 4,455 2,845
Parts for Agricultural Machinery 1,752 2,566 905
Totals 9,542 14,255 6,697
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1959
Automobiles and Trucks
One of the greatest developments in the import trade
of Argentina since World War I, has been the increase of Auto-
motive purchases. Automobile imports increased in value from
an annual average in the pre-war period of slightly 5,000,000
gold pesos to an annual average in the period 1924-26 of nearly
55,000,000 gold pesos or 5.1% of total imports. However, due
to the retrenchment in Argentine purchases in the early thirties
the average annual value of automobile imports dropped to
5,550,000 gold pesos in the period 1952-54. For 1957, 1958 and
1959 the total number and value of automobile purchases, includ-
ing passenger cars, trucks, and chassis were as follows:
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Table XVIII
Argentine -Automotive Imports
1957-1959
Commodity Volume Value
1957 1958 1959 1957 1958 1959
(#1,000)
Passenger Cars 50,722 57,925 22,257 $9,191 $12,268 $5,991
Trucks 2,556 5,952 5,187 594 1,446 565
Chassis 15.182 8.909 5.121 5. 671 2.472 1.242
Total 46,240 52,784 50,545 $13,456 #16,186 |7,796
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Petroleum Products and Coal
A large amount of the gasoline and lubricants to op-
erate these automobiles comes from abroad. A large part of the
fuel supplies for the merchant, the railway, and manufacturing
also comes from foreign sources. Petroleum products and coal
constitute roughly 10 and 5% respectively, of the total value
. of Argentina's imports. Imports of these two commodities ac-
counted for 17.1% of the total imports during the three years
1952-54, and 16% in 1955. For the years 1937-1959 the average
has been approximately sixteen percent.

Table XIX
.Argent ine Fetroleum Products
and Coal Imports
1937-1939
1937 1938
(In Thousands of U.S.
1939
Dollars)
Goal 24,561 21,783 18,877
Crude Petroleum 25,607 29,260 24,771
Fuel & Diesel Oil 13.118 15,908 11,633
Total 63,286 66,951 54,781
Total Value of Imports 469,082 430,374 312,088
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
The United Kingdom dominates the coal trade, while un
til recently, the United States was the leading source for Ar-
gentina's petroleum imports. Germany was the only other impor-
tant source of coal, providing one-tenth of the total in recent
years. British dominance is due to two important factors:
(1) British vessels, which transport a large share of Argentina
farm and animal products to Europe, are able to bring coal as
ballast at a very low rate and (2) ^reference is shown to Bri-
tish coal by the British-owned railroads, factories, and meat-
packing plants.
Since World War I, Peru, Dutch Guiana, Mexico and Ve-
nezuela have become important as suppliers of Argentine imports
of petroleum products. In the pre-war period, 1911-1913, over
75% of Argentina's imports of petroleum came from the United
States and now, only 25% is imported. However, many of these
sources which have been mentioned as suppliers of Argentine

-76-
petroleum are owned by the United States.
Food Products
Like most other classes of imports, food products in-
clude a long list of items from all parts of the world. They
consist almost entirely of commodities which Argentina cannot
produce because of climate or insufficient population in the
northern, or subtropical parts of the country.
Imports of food products average approximately 10% of
Argentina's imports. Fruits and non-alcoholic beverages, (cof-
fee, tea, and yerba mate) are of outstanding importance. The
following shows the imports as of the period 1937-1939:
*
Table XX
Argentine Imports of Food Products
1937-1939
Value
(In Thousands of U.S. Dollars)
Commodity 1937 1958 1939
Coffee #3,070 $3,672 $2,736
Tea 1,410 1,369 1,129
Yerba Mate 4,520 4,181 3,394
Fresh Fruits 5,292 5,671 6,058
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Other Products
Argentina's imports of tobacco leaf for the same pe-
riod have been $3,420,000, $3,834,000, and $3,246,000. The im-
ports of cigarettes, in comparison, have been ^325, 000, $460,000
and ^156,000 for 1937, 1938, and 1939 respectively.

-77-
Wood products and paper, and paper manufactures are
also important imports, as well as chemicals and colors.
Argentina's Exports
Although -Argentina's trade is widely distributed, five
countries - the United Kingdom, the United States, Germany, Bel-
gium and prance account for over two-thirds of the total.
Table XXI
Percentage of Argentine Exports
3y Principal Countries
1956-1959
United Kingdom 35.1$ £9.1% 32 . 8% 35.9%
United States 12.2% 12.8% 8.5% 12.0%
Belgium 7.8% 9.4% 7.4% 7.0%
Germany 5.8% 6 • 8% 11.7% 5.7%
France 5.3% 4.2% 5.4% 4.8%
Italy 2.5% 6.2% 2.5% 2.1%
Others 31.3% 31.5% 34.7% 32.5%
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1938 and 1939
Composition of Argentina's Foreign Trade through 1959
The United Kingdom sells Argentina coal, textiles, ge-
neral iron and steel goods, jute, railway equipment, and other
miscellaneous manufactures. The United States dominates the
trade in agricultural machinery, automobiles, wood and petrole-
um products, as well as in the trade in fruits, tobacco products,
general iron and steel manufactures, and numerous other types of
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machinery, especially mining equipment and office and household
appliances.
Germany furnishes a great variety of manufactured
goods to Argentina. Of particular importance are the cheaper
grade of hardware, machine tools, kitchen utensils, toys and
school supplies. Germany also provided a large share of Argen-
tina's purchases of electrical machinery and electrical wires
and cable.
Italy specializes in cheap grades of cotton and woolen
goods and artificial silk. Also, due to the large Italian po-
pulation in Argentina, the sale of Italian products especially
certain foodstuffs, such as olives and olive oil help to augment
Italy's exports.
Belgium also furnishes considerable quantities of the
cheaper grades of cotton yarns and textiles, as well as iron and
steel manufactures
Imports from France are, primarily, luxury goods, such
as high grade silks and woolens, novelties, perfumery, fine leath-
er goods, and ladies' notions. The urban population of Argen-
tina, especially the people of Buenos Aires, look largely to
France for these commodities, especially since Paris is the
style center for Argentina. France also exports to Argentina
tires and tubes and iron and steel products, and a consifierable
proportion of the trade in patent medicines. (1)
(1) Jones, G.F., Op. Cit. Page 166
(1) Phelps, L.P.
,
Op. Cit. Page 87
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Table XXII
Total Argentine Imports and Exports , 1916^42
(in Paper Pesos and United States Dollars)
Thousands of Paper Pesos Thousands of U.S. Dollars
Year Imports Exports Imports Exports
1910 862 ,165 884,,253 $364,198 $ 373,528FT J
1911 920.,500 777.
,
994 388,724 328,545
1912 1,015,,598 1,140,,153 429,229 481,870
1913 1,127,,789 1,179, , 900 476,866 498,901
1914 733 ,023 916^,208 310 , 182 387 , 698
1915 694j,291 1,323,,135 290,328 553,289
1916 832, 113 1,302,,272 353,234 552,817
1917 864,,366 1,256,,386 379,407 548,848
1918 1,137,
,
734 1,821,,515 507,916 813,176
1919 1,490,,392 2,343,,103 647,856 1,018,519
1920 2,124, , 927 2,372,,921 836,223 933,816
1921 1, 703, 486 1,525,,294 541,994 485,299
1922 1,567, 376 1, 536, 382 564,922 553,751
1923 1,973,,705 1, 753,,094 679,533 603,579
1924 1,883, 432 2,298, 624 644,503 786,580
1925 1,992.,836 1,972, 568 801,430 793,279
1926 1,869,,310 1,800, 406 757,358 729,411
1927 1, 947, 283, 2,293, 921 824,561 971,342
1928 1, 901, 608 2, 396, 608 805,931 1,016,936
1929 jl
,
»oy
,
HAS 819,509 907 r300
1930 1,679,,961 1,395,,691 617,200 512,800
1931 1,173,,828 1,455,,815 344,600 428,300
1932 836, 265 1,287, 782 215,180 331,100
1933 897, 149 1,120, 842 225,900 282,100 (1)
1934 1,109, 932 1,438, 431 195,148 288,100
1935 1,174, 981 1,569, 349 201,111 304,219
1936 1,116, 711 1,655, 712 219,162 324,455
1937 1,557, 684 2,310, 998 284,822 447,543
1938 1,460, 888 1,400, 453 261,601 258,637
1939 1,338, 332 1,573, 173 197^605 232,279
1940 1,498, 757 1,427, 638 (2)
1941 1,276, 655 1,464, 622 * *
1942 1,274, 149 1,782, 983 * *
(1) Values given in old gold dollars from 1933 on.
In current dollars the values are:
$277,463 $346,615
327,430 424,317
339,570 512,549
371,083 549,365
482,259 757,776
442,941 437,922
334,583 393,293
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
(2) Statesman's Year Book (1940-42)
* Figures not available

Section IV
U. S. Trade Relations
Tresty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of 1855
The earliest commercial contacts of the United States
with Argentina were due largely to the China Trade. American
vessels going to or from the Orient would stop at Buenos Aires.
During the Napoleonic Wars, American trade developed rapidly
at the expense of the British. Within a month of the establish-
ment of the "Provisional Junta of the Provinces of the Rio de!
la Plata", President Madison appointed Joel R. Poinsett as
commercial agent to Buenos Aires. As has been mentioned in
Chapter I page 23, the formal declaration of independence of
Argentina did not occur until 1816, although the Junta was
formed on May 25, 1811.
On November 15, 1811, William Gilchrist Miller of
Philadelphia was recognized by the Argentine Government as
Vice-Consul, and in May, 1813, Thomas Lloyd Halsey, was appoin-
ted by President Madison as the first American Consul in Buen-
os Aires.
It is interesting to note that official commercial
relations with Argentina began in 1810, although diplomatic
recognition of the new nation by the United States was not
granted until 1823. However, it wasn*t until 1853 that the
treaties of commerce and navigation were concluded, although
there had been attempts for negotiating a commercial treaty
j
especially since England had made a commercial treaty with

Argentina in 1825. ^he treaty was signed on July 27,1853, in
the Province of Entre Rios, which was then the national capi-
tal. Ratifications of the treaty were exchanged on December
20, 1854. The treaty consisted of 14 articles and contained
the conditional most-favored-nation clause. This pact was the
basis of the diplomatic and economic relations between Argen-
tina and the United States until the signing of the reciprocal
trade treaty at Buenos Aires on October 14, 1941. (1)
Discritainat ion Against Argentine Wool. 1867
The iariff Act of 1867 was the first serious attempt
to exclude Argentine products from the United States. This
tariff placed a prohibitive duty upon unmanufactured wool,
which was a major item in the Argentine export trade and which
practically excluded raw wool from the United States market.
Manuel R. Garcia, Argentine Minister in 7/ashington at that
time attempted, as he said:
"to show that the interests of indus-
try, of commerce, of the consumer,
and of revenue, require modification
of the duties which weigh so heavily
upon the raw material imported by
this country from the Argentine Re-
public." (2)
He also suggested a treaty of commerce providing
special rates upon the chief commodities in the Argentine-
United States trade-lumber, breadstuff s, agricultural imple-
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Oit. Page 105
(2) Phelps, 7.L., Op. Cit. Page 212
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ments, wool, hides and canned goods. However, Hamilton Fish,
Secretary of State, informed Mr, Garcia that such:.a treaty would
not be considered, sinee it would put into effect the most-
favor-nation clause in many existing United States treaties. (1)
In 1890, the McKinley Tariff Act was passed, which
authorized the President to impose a duty on hides and other
products when imported from countries whose treatment of United
States products was "unequal and unreasonable". (2) The
United States department of State now attempted to secure a
treaty but the -Argentine Government stated that the duties it
had imposed on products, such as lumber, refined petroleum, and
agricultural implements, and other manufactures were justifi-
able, sinc» the United States had imposed a tariff on wool which
was a major export to the United States at that time. However,
the Act of 1890 did not stipulate that duty reductions could
be made, so that no lowering of duties by either country re-
sulted.
However, the penalty duties that could be levied under
the McKinley Act were not imposed on imports from Argentina,
and finally in 1894, the penalty provisions of the Act of 1890
were repealed in the Wilson Act of 1894, In 1897 the Dingley
Tariff Aot gave the president power to negotiate treaties pro-
ID This statement by Secretary Fish is difficult to understand
however, in view of the fact that the United States followed
the conditional interpretation of the most-favored-nation
clause, prior to 1923.
(2) Phelps, V.L., Op. Cit. Page 212
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viding for a reduction of not more than 20 percent in the du-
ties on any article imported into the United States in exchange
for equivalent concessions by any other country. A treaty was
finally signed in which a 20 percent reduction on wool was
granted, and Argentina reduced the duties on a number of United
States products, but the treaty was not ratified by the United
States Senate. (1)
In 1922, the Fordney-MoCumber Tariff increased the
duties on many staples, thus increasing the existing difficul-
ties between the United States and Argentina, Moreover, this
law was followed by subsequent tariff acts which made the im-
portation of many Argentine staples into the United States,
impossible. (2)
Sanitary Embargo. 1927
This embargo was imposed by the United States Depart-
ment of Agriculture
,
which authorized the prohibition of im-
ported meats from any part of the world. This prohibition
might cover an entire country or simply an infested area or
region, while permitting imports from uninfested areas of the
same country.
This embargo was put into effect in order to guard
the cattle and livestock industry of the United States from
(1) Phelps, V.L., Op. Cit. Page 216
(2) A typical case is that of linseed, advanced from the free
list to 20£ per bushel in 1913, to 300 in 1921, and to 400
in 1922, to 560 in 1929, and 650 in 1930.

-84
the "hoof-and mouth disease". The disease is widespread through-
out Europe, and is endemic in mild form in parts of Argentina.
In the United States there have bean a half dozen outbreaks
in a hundred years. The last one, a relatively minor one, was
in California in 1929. It was stamped out but not until
400,000 animals had to be slaughtered. The virus causing hoof-
and-mouth disease, a violently contagious and damaging ailment
of cattle, sheep and hogs, has not been identified. Little is
understood about it and partly because it is so contagious, la-
boratory work on it is forbidden in the United States. However,
it has been found that the virus exists in the bone or marrow
of the infested animal, and that it spreads through careless
disposal of meat scraps, bones and refuse. Heat kills the
virus; freezing does not. (1)
Smoot-Hawley Tariff
The Smoot-Hawley tariff of 1930 not only nade this
Sanitary Embargo into law, but enlarged it to require embargoes
against every part of a country, even though well-defined areas
of the country were known to be free from objectionable disea-
ses. Moreover, a 6^ per pound duty was put on fresh beef, as
a further measure to keep it out even if the quarantine should
be lifted. This was accomplished primarily by the senators
and representatives from American cattle-producing states.
The Smoot-Hawley Tariff had a disastrous effect on -Argentina 's
(1) The Americana, Vol. 2, Page 19,(1936)

trade with the United States, for the exports from Argentina
dropped from $89,002,000 in 1929 to only $11, 266,000 in 1932,
During the five year period, 1935-39, they averaged only
161,928,000 as compared with #75,000,000 in the 1926-30
period, which was an annual decline of approximately
113,000,000. (1)
Argentina set up an exchange control system in 1931
the chief function of which was to cut down the imports from
the United States in something like the proportion that the
Smoot-Hawley Tariff had curtailed American imports from Argen-
tina. However, American specialities, such as automobiles,
radios, electric reftigerators, home and office equipment, and
the various other products of mass production which are known
for home comfort, office efficiency, and a high standard of
living, continued to enter the Argentine market. Importers of
many of these United States products were denied dollar exchang
at the official rate and had to buy their dollars in the open
market, which increased the cost of their merchandise. Even
when this failed to decrease sales, importers were forced to
pay a surcharge of 20 percent for their dollars, which, of
course, added that much to the cost of their goods. But even
this measure was ineffectual and it became apparent that price
was not a decisive factor in marketing these American special-
ties, so the Exchange Control Commission established a black
list and flatly refused to grant import license for many Ame-
(1) See Table XXII, Page 79

rican products.
Sanitary Convention of 1955
In May of 1935, a Sanitary Convention was signed by
the United States and Argentina. This provided for a regional
application of the quarantine permitting entrance of fresh
meats from areas unaffected by foot-and-mouth disease. The
importance of this Convention is that Patagonia is known to
be free of hoof-and-mouth disease and that Patagonian meat
could enter the United States though it would have to pay the
6# duty. However, this Convention was not ratified by the
United States Senate because of the opposition of the cattle
Senators. If the Convention had been ratified, the Argentine
Government would have been more eager to undertake later ne-
gotiations. The irony of all this is that the kill of cattle
in Patagonia only amounts to 10,000 tons per year which is
approximately of the total American consumption. (1)
The Roca-Runoiman Treaty
On May 2, 1933 the Argentine Government signed the
Roca-Runciman trade treaty with Great Britain, This treaty
with Great Britain became the cornerstone of Argentines
National recovery and also of its foreign economic policy.
The factors leading to the Roca-Runciman treaty go
back to 1927 when Argentina, along with the rest of the world
was in a flourishing economic condition. Foreign trade
reached a total of $971,342,000 and a favorable trade balance
(1) Gunther, J., Op. Cit. Page 304

of $46,781,000. (1) Foreign capital was entering the coun-
try in large volume and the peso was close to par. In Aug-
ust 1927, Argentina returned to the gold standard after
being off it for fourteen years. A year later however, the
international money market tightened and the flow of foreign
capital into the country ceased and in September 1928, Arg-
entina began to export gold in response to the high interes
rates that were being paid on short-term loans. This caused
a decline in the gold holdings of the "Caja de Conversion"
(Gold Conversion Office) and later, of the banks. Gold ship
ments continued in such volume during 1929 that the govern-
ment closed the "Caja de Conversion" in December and Argen-
tina was again off the gold standard. Until the establish-
ment of the Central Bank in 1934, the "Caja" had been the
issuing agency for currency, but the issuance or retirement
of currency was strictly automatic, the "Caja" issuing or
receiving paper in exchange for gold at the fixed rate of
$0.44, gold, for each paper peso.
At this time, the whole world was dropping into
the Great Depression and in 1930, the passage of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff i& the United States was a severe blow to Ar-
gentina's eoonomy, since it closed the profitable American
market to many of Argentina's farm products. Moreover, Ar-
gentina's troubles were aggravated by a bad crop failure,
so that the export trade only amounted to f 512, 800, 000 which
(1) See Table XXTlPage 79
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was #394,500,000 less than the previous year, and imports
exceeded exports by $104,400,000. (1)
.Although the "Caja de Conversion" was closed, gold
shipments continued with the private banks drawing on their
own reserves. Argentina's balance of payments left an unfa-
voreblB balance of 262,000,000 pesos for 1930, and the peso -
was quoted at 22 percent below par. Moreover, the existing
provisional government decided to pay the service charges on
the foreign debt in gold, in an effort to relieve the pressure
on the exchange market. But, notwithstanding thes adverse
conditions, the "de facto" government continued to increase
its expenditures with the result that the year closed with
a budget deficit of 357,000,000 pesos, or 34 percent of the
total expenditures which were 1,043,000,000 pesos. The
floating debt on December 31, 1930, totaled 1,181,000,000
pesos, or more than the entire annual budget.
The economic depression, plus the urgent need for
the adjustment of the balance of payments and the improve-
ment of the State* s finances, forced the government to re-
duce expenditures and to find ways for increasing the reven-
ue. It was only natural that, since 50 percent of the gov-
ernment's revenue is collected from customs duties, that the
duties were increased by 10 percent and there was a general
increase in the arbitrary ad valorem assessments on which the
duties are levied. The resulting increase in the cost of
(1) See Table XXUPage 79
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imported articles with the decreasing power of the masses,
reduced imports in 1931 to #344,600,000 from #617,200,000
in 1930, Even though exports for 1931 exceeded imports by
$83,700,000 these measures did not succeed in eliminating
the budget deficit and the unfavorable balance in the inter-
national payments, and at the end of 1931, the floating debt
was 1,342,000,000 pesos.
It should be pointed out that although the govern-
ments internal credit was exhausted, it did not suspend
payments on the foreign debt, despite the continued decline
in the value of the currency.
The sharp decline in exports, especially grain, had
deprived the exchange market of balance abroad, and condi-
tions became worse by Great Britain's abandonment of the gold
standard. In October 1931, President Uriburu set up an Ex-
change Control Commission with the power of fixing the rates
of exchange daily, since the exchange problem presented a
serious stumbling block to any recovery projects. However,
as the country* s requirements in foreign exchanges were
much in excess of receipts, this control caused the "free-
zing" of large sums which could not be sent out of the coun-
try. It was officially estimated that these blocked funds
amounted to approximately 1,000,000 pesos a day. The Bank
of the Nation estimated in 1933 that the exchange require-
ments were 1,347,000,000 pesos and since only 1,092,000,000
were available, there remained a "frozen" deficit for that

year of 255,000,000 pesos. (1)
These blocked funds represented the cost of import-
ed merchandise and the profits of foreign-owned corporations
which could not be remitted abroad, since the necessary ex-
change was unavailable. Thus, the future of the Argentine
peso was uncertain as long as these funds were awaiting the
transfer abroad. In 1933, .as the means of relieving this
pressure, the Roca-Runciman Trade Treaty with Great Britain
was b<brn
As White points the Roca-Runciman Treaty, as the
diplomats express it, "implemented" the slogan "Buy from
those who buy from us", which had been coined by Sir Malcolm
Robertson, the British ambassador, at Buenos Aires who"sold"
i
it to Argentine Rural Society, the official organization of
the cattle batons. (2) Naturally, this treaty was against
the policy of the United States, which advocated "triangular"
or multilateral trade instead of bilateral and barter arrange
ments. The treaty provided for a guarantee against any re-
duction in the British imports of Argentine meat and, in re-
turn, Argentina was obliged to abandon triangular trade and
adopt bilateral trade, which is, as some define it, a first
cousin of barter. Thus, due to the economic conditions,
Argentina feared the possible results that the Ottawa Agree-
(1) White, J.W.
,
Page 202
(2) Ibid, Page 203
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ment, which set up dominion preference as the basis of Bri-
tain^ foreign trade, might have. She was forced by Britain
and not Germany, into its disastrous experiment with bilateral
trade and barter.
Directed Economy
Having concluded negotiations for the Roca-Runciman
Treaty, Argentina then put into effect a National Recovery
Plan of directed economy which was similar in many ways to
that of the New Deal in the United States. The Argentine re-
covery plan was a success both materially and psychologically.
From the beginning, it supplied the national government with
funds and reduced the public debt. The plan provided for de-
preciated currency, controlled grain prices, restrictions of
imports through government control of exchange rates, increase
of exports by means of new trade treaties, and the solution of
the unemployment problem by means of a vast program of public
works.
The government, in all, set up nearly a score of
boards and commissions to regulate virtually every line of pro-
duction in the country, as well as to study such problems as,
unemployment, transportation, and public works.
However, one of the most important results of the
recovery plan was the establishment of the Central Bank in 1934
to act as a bank of issue as well as a controller of credit ope-
rations by discounting the paper of the private

banks. Sinoe the value of the country's exports fluctuate
greatly according to the quantity and prices at which they
can be sold, the financial policy of the country is directly
influenced. As an example, the value of the exports in 1933
was only half the value of the 1928 exports, a drop from ap-
proximately 2,400,000,000 pesos to 1,100,000,000. (1) Due
to the inelasticity of its banking and currency organization,
the country was not in a position to handle the complicated
monetary and credit problems produced by such fluctuations.
The old "Caja de Conversion" was not organized to
handle extreme expansion or restriction of credit, so since
the "Caja" could not function in the face of a long contin-
ued flight of gold, it had to be closed which took Argentina
off the gold standard.
When the Central Bank was created, the gold reserves
of the "Caja" were revalued, another lesson which Argentina
had learned from the New Deal in Washington. The reserve
was revalued at 1,224,417,645 pesos, giving the government
the tidy profit of 663,411,610 pesos, to which 37,649,156
pesos i# nickel and copper coins, taken over by the Central
Bank from the government, were added, making a total profit
of 701,060,766 pesos. (2) The government used this profit to
pay off some of its debts to the bank of the nation and private
(1) See Table XXIE Page 79
(2) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Page 209

banks, and to liquidate several unsound banks.
Bilateral Trade Treaties with Other Countries
The Roca-Runciman Treaty had provided that the mon-
ey which Argentina received from Great Britain oould be spent
only in Great -Britain. Argentina was compelled to revise its
trade treaties with other countries and to put them on a bi-
lateral bais so that exchanges would balance them selves.
Up to now Argentina's treaties had contained the
most-favored-nation clause in everything relating to customs
dttties, tha navigation of rivers, and the freedom of trade.
This clause was unconditional insome cases, and in others,
it was grantedin the form of reciprocal concessions. The
most-favored-nation clause has the tendency to develop and
expand international trade by guaranteeing a system of free
competition and equality. However, in recent years, under the
policy of economic self-sufficiency, there has been a growing
tendency to restrict the application of the clause by sur-
rounding it with interpretations which narrow its scope.
Since the principle upon which the clause is based is that
of equality and impartiality, these restrictive interpreta-
tion have had the effeat of nullifying the clause. Then,
since the Great Depression, these restrictive interpretations
have become more and more general and usually they have been
designed to hide protective policies which are contrary to
the very principle of equality of opportunity.
Thus, Argentine economists have pointed to the

Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the United States Sanitary Embargo
against Argentine meat as two outstanding examples ofi restric-
tive measures designed to nullify the operation of the most-
favored-na t ion clause, Argentine exporters are denied the oppor-
tunity in American markets, which is the basic principle of the
clause.
Since protective tariffs failed to do away with the
foreign competition which the most-favored-nation clause fos-
ters, some nations began setting up import quotas. These quotas
were designed to protect local industry from the competition
of countries producing certain goods at low prices. Moreover,
in the 1930* s some of the European countries began using quotas
as a means of extending trade concessions to particular nations
for political and military purposes.
Argentina continued to use the most-favored-nation
clause in respect to customs treatment in: most of its new trade
treaties. However, the clause was abolished effectively in
practice by the arbitrary manner in which exchange control was
used to favor these nations which Argentina wished to favor
and to discriminate against those it did not wish to favor.
In its Trade and Exchange Agreement of September
28, 1934 with Germany, provisions were made for a bilateral
balancing interchange of exports and imports very similar to
that provided for in the British treaty. In the case of
Germany, the export and import trade consisted almost ex-
clusively of merchandise. In the case of Great Britain, an

-95-
iraportant factor consisted of the "invisible" imports for
which Argentina had to pay just as though they had been mer-
chandise. These "invisible imports" comprised ocean freights,
insurance, earnings of Britiah-owned railroads, and dividends
of other British companies in Argentina
Also, Argentina signed new trade treaties containing
some form of bilateral or compensated arrangement with Chile,
Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Brazil, France, Spain, Uru-
guay, Finland, Rumania, Austria, Peru, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, However, in all these trade treaties, a specific pro-
vision was made that Argentina might deduct a reasonable
amount from the exchange oreated by its exports and use this
exchange for payments on its foreign debt before granting
permission for remittances to the country with which the
treaty was signed. White points out that while Argentina
signed a whole series of new treaties designed to put all her
international trade on a bilateral basis, she was at the same
time, faking careful measures in each treaty to protect her-
self from the natural and inevitable consequence of bilateral
trade; which seeks to aave imports and exports cancel each
other and so leave no cash balance at either end of the
channel. (1)
Failure of Negotiations. 1959
In November 1959, a staff of United States nego-
tiators were sent to Buenos Aires to arrange a trade treaty,
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Page 215

The Argentine government, on the pretext that the member of
the Permanent Inter-Ministerial Commission who were to he the
Argentine negotiators eould not be spared from Buenos Aires
for the necessary period of time, insisted that the negoti-
ations be held in Buenos Aires instead of Washington,
When the negotiations began, the United States no
longer had its market for agricultural products in Great
Britain and France under the escape clause in the trade trea-
ties with those countries. The United States had also lost
its market for manufactured goods in Argentina because Ar-
gentina was, of course, trading its agricultural products
for European manufactured goods.
Since the signing of the Roca-Runciman Treaty,
Argentina had rebuilt her entire economic structure on bi-
lateral compensated trade treaties which wanted balance trade
with each of the nations with which she trades. Since the
United States* international trade is built on multilateral-
ism, it was obvious that one of the countries would have to
change its trading policy. Argentina had announced that the
United States would be given equality of treatment but on the
day before this statement, hundreds of United States articles
were put on the black list to serve as trading weapons.
Also, the United States government was unwilling to antago-
nize the farm bloc in an election year and insisted on cir-
cumscribing tariff concessions with quota limitations.
The net result was failure.
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Trade Agreement with the United States
In 1941, the two countries were in need of the other's
products and they no longer were fearful that their respec-
tive markets would be flooded by imports from each. The
preliminary discussions began late in 1940, but the formal
intention of drawing up a trade agreement was not announced
until May 12, 1941. The agreement was formally signed at
Buenos -Aires on October 14, and it became provisionally ef-
fective on November 15.
Concessions by Argentina
The duty concessions made in the new agreement by
Argentina are, on the whole, moderate. Tariff rates are low-
ered on 39 items which, together, constituted 18.2% of United
States exports to Argentina in 1940; rates are bound on 88
articles which accounted for 12 percent of United States
shipments for 1940. Altogether, the concessions cover a re-
latively small proportion of United States exports in 1940,
because they affect these goods whose import Argentina has
severely restricted. Reductions on only 12 items were effec-
tive immediately, among which are reductions of 30 and 35
percent in the rates on prunes and raisins, and one of 50
percent on imports of fresh apples, pears, and grapes during
the Argentine winter season. Included in this category also
are slight reductions on light, inexpensive passenger cars;
somewhat greater confcessions in medium-weight, inexpensive
automobiles; and a small cut om imports of truck and bus
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chassis; and there are other products upon which the entire
concession was applied.
The balance of the rate reductions, however, was
to remain partially or wholly suspended until Argentine re-
ceipts from imports duties exceed 270,000,000 paper pesos
in every calendar year.
The provision which was considered to be the most
important was Argentina* s pledge to grant imports from the
United States most-favored-nation treatment, that is, to
treat them in all respects on a footing of complete equal-
ity with those from other countries, There were, however,
significant exceptions. The United States has agreed to
forego the benefit of tariff preferences and exemptions
which Argentina may extend, on a regional basis, to its
neighbors, or any exchange and quota preference granted to
Peru and contiguous countries during the current European
war. The Argentine government also declared that it couldn f t
abandon the preferential exchange treatment of British goods
because ot its inability to convert its sterling balances
freely into dollar exchange. Moreover, the Argentine gov-
ernment did not agree to terminate the system of differen-
tial exchange rates by which Argentina discouraged importation
of many products. (1)
Oonoessions by the United States
"On paper", the concessions made by this country
(1) DeWilde, J.C.fc Wood, Bryoe, "Foreign Policy Report"
December, 1941, "U.S. -Trade Ties with Argentina"
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were much greater than those granted by Argentina, They co-
ver a large number of items which composed 92,4 percent of
United States imports from Argentina in 1939 and 74.6 percent
in 1940, Rates were reduced in goods which constituted
69.6, 53«6, and 43.5 percent of imports from Argentina in
1938, 1939, and 1940 respectively.
The concessions are divided into lists. Schedule II
includes products of which Argentina is generally the primary
source; and Schedule III, which comprises products of which
European countries are normally the chief suppliers and on
which the United States reserved the right to revoke its
concessions on six months* notice any time after the termina-
ting of the war. (1) In Schedule II, which included the
greater part of the imports benefited by the agreement, one
of the most important concessions was the reduction in the
duty on linseed or flaxseed, from 650 per bushel to 32.50.
The agreement cut in half the duty on canned meats which was
6^ per pound, quebracho extract which was 15 percent ad valo-
rem, oil cattle hides which was 5^-0 per pound equivalent in
recent years to 80 to 110 percent ad valorem.
Another concession of significance was the reduc-
tion of the duty on grapes (25 cents per cubic foot) and on
fresh plums, prunes, or prunelles (-g-cent per paund) by 50 per
cent during the spring and summer months when none of the
United States* home grown frikit reaches its market. The
(1) Schedule I includes concession granted by Argentina
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United States also cut b# more than one-third, certain dutiable
grades of wool, less than 44* s in fineness, of which the
United States produces a quantity less than 2 percent of the
total domestic wool output. Of less significance, there were
other duty reductions on such products as meat extracts and
fresh asparagus. Tariff rates on a considerable number of ar-
ticles such as fresh pears and alfalfa seed were bound. Some
of the items which the United States has agreed not to take
off the free list are earpet wool; hides and skins other than
those of cattle; certain fur skins, sheep, lamb and goat casings,
crude yerba mate, quebracho wood, and such fertilizers as tank-
age, bone meal and dried blood.
In Schedule III, one of the most important conces-
sions was the reduction in the duty of Italian-type cheese
from 7 cents per pound (with a minimum ad valorem rate of 35
percent) to 5 oents (with a minimum of 25 percent ad valorem).
Rates on wines and liqueurs were to be kept at the levels to which
which they were lowered, in the agreement concluded with France.
In addition there were other reductions of less importance.
Evaluation of the United States-Argentina Trade .Agreement
To attempt to evaluate this treaty from its incep-
tion to the present day would be extremely difficult because
of the conditions of international trade in wartime. In war-
time, the chief factor in determining the trends of trade is
not the tariff rates but the need for certain scarce commodi-
ties and shipping facilities.

The agreement did not provide for United States
imports of any grain except linseed, but the reduction on
linseed was to compensate for the rapid rise of freight charges
on Argentine linseed shipments during the war. It further
provides that the rate will be raised to 50 cents, once the
President finds that the trade situation is no longer abnormal.
This treaty did not open the United States markets to chilled
and frozen beef. Moreover, the decrease on wool was only on
certain grades, and carpet wool, which accounts for 85 percent
of woolimports from Argentina, was already on the free list.
The agreement was to remain in force until November
15, 1944 with the stipulation that if one of the governments
had notified the other in writing of the intention to termi-
ate the agreement on that date, it was to remain in force un-
til the expiration of six months from the date on which such
notice should have been given. This agreement may never be
put to the test of proving itself to be either the instrument
for better trade relations or not. If this trade treaty
would remain effective, of more interest would be the posi-
tion which this treaty would obtain in Argentine economy,
which has been bilateral.

Seotion V
Argent ina-American Gol la borat ion
Stumbling Blocks to be Removed
There have been many factors in our relations with
Argentina that have been such "stumbling blocks" that even if
our imports from Argentina increase, cordial relations and
friendship will be as impossible as they have been. I do not
wish to infer that the Argentines are more interested in being
"good friends" than in increasing their profits on exports to
the United States. Argentines are just as eager for making
money as any other nationality including the "money mad Ameri-
cans", However, the tact and the manner in which business is
transacted is most important.
Before discussing means to remove these obstacles
one should remember th.at the Argentines have had primarily four
"master bonds" with Europe. (1) Historical: Argentina with
the exception of Uruguay has the smallest percentage of Indians
and it has no negro problem. As has been mentioned, millions
of immigrants have come from Europe, especially Spain and Italy
(2) Economic: European capital, particularly British capital
built up the country. British investments still are worth
about $2, 000, 000, 000 and approximately 30 to 40 percent of
total expocts went to Britain, (3) Cultural & Intellectual:
Nearly all intellectual thought and culture came from Europe,
France particularly. (4) Religion: The Catholic Church repre-
sented and still represents a profound European influence pri-
marily because all priests in Argentina are Spanish or Italian.
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Beef
"Beef I Every year in .August, the
Argentine government and the cream
of society turn out in their best
attire to pay annual homage to a
bull. The opening day of the live-
stock show of the Argentine Rural
Society in Palermo Park vies with
the Independence Day gala perfor-
mance at the opera as the impor-
tant official and social event of
the year. The president attends in
state, accompanied by the entire
cabinet and escorted by the magni-
ficent San Martin Mounted Grenadiers.
A formal-dress "must" for the di-
plomatic corps, the occasion pro-
vides the same lucrative source
for furriers, dress designers, and
milliners that Easter Sunday does in
the United States". (1)
Yet, we of the United States have imposed a sanita-
ry embargo on Argentine fresh meats, an embargo which was la-
ter incorporated in the Tariff Act. of 1930. The United States
Senate even failed to ratify the Sanitary Convention of 1935.
Moreover, President Roosevelt did not help matters when he
visited Buenos Aires in 1936 and said that he hoped applica-
tion of the quarantine on a regional basis would come about,
because unfortunately Congress thought differently. (2) Also
the Argentine Government was not allowed to sell its own meats
in its restaurant at the New York World's Fair in 1939-40. (3)
Meanwhile, the Senate was attempting to raise the duty on
canned meats higher than it already was, and in the Spring of
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Page 189
(2) Bemis, S.F. , "The Latin American Policy of the U. S."Page 305
(3) Haring, C.H., Op. Cit. Page 29
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1939 permission for the Sale of Argentine corned beef to the
United States Navy was denied, although corned beef in the
United States is no longer produced commercially. Yet, while
we were promising to abolish these restrictions on Argentine
beef, in reality nothing was done to substantiate and further
the Good Neighbor Policy.
From 30 to 40$ of the population of the United States
suffers from an insufficient meat diet owing to the high prioe
of American beef. (1) Thus, a limited and correctly regulated
importation and distribution of Argentine meats would help to
correct this deficiency. It is obvious that the people of
the United States could consume more beef* Argentina f s entire
export of meat totaling 600,000 tons of a year is only l\$o of
the American consumption of 8,000,000 tons. Thus, if the United
States permitted the entry of 160,000 tons of Argentine meat,
Argentina f s exports would be increased by 26% while it would
only be an increase of 2$ in our total consumption. (2)
The only possible explanation that seems feasible
is that the Cattle Seaators fear that the quality of Argentine
beef is far superior to American beef. White in his book on
Argentina states that if the American public were ever allowed
to eat the delicious fillet steaks which can be had at the best
hotels in Buenos Aires for 30 or 35 cents, they probably would
stop eating Chicago beef in which case the American cattle industry
would be ruined.
(1) Haring, C.H.
,
Op. Cit. Page 29
(2) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Page 219
*
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I, For one do not believe that this could ever be
feasible. However, I do believe, that the Sanitary Embargo of
1935 should be ratified by the Senate, so that the Argentines
will not feel that the United States is deliberately discrim-
inating against them, Also, if 160,000 tons of meat could be
purchased from Argentina it would be one of the major steps in
creating good will. We must remember that Argentina is proud
and sensitive concerning its beef.
Nationalist Jealousy & Latent Fear of Independence
Argentina was the first of the South American govern-
ments to recognize the Monroe Doctrine, to adhere to its prin-
ciples and to offer to base its foreign policy on collaboration
with the United States in carrying out the doctrine. (1) After
enthusiastically supporting President Monroe, Argentina soon
found out that it was to receive no help from the doctrine and
thus, Argentina became its worse enemy.
Las Heras, Head of the Buenos Aires government, had
proposed to the United States on July 28, 1825 that the Monroe
Doctrine be broadened in scope to preclude the recognition of
territorial aggression on the part of any of the American
nations themselves. If this had been done many of the "regret-
table" things that happened in Inter-American relations during
the next century might have been prevented. At the time of
the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, there were only five
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Page 269

• independent countries in South America- the United Provinces
of the River Plate, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Paraguay
and Uruguay were not yet independent of Buenos .Aires. Bolivia
was still a part of Peru, and Ecuador and Venezuela still he-
longed to Colombia.
It is true that the United States did help keep the
newly created south American States from the threatened Euro-
pean invasion at the time of the Holy alliance in 1823. How-
ever, the refusal of the United States to accept the Argentine
proposal and its action twenty years later in annexing more
than half of Mexico 1 s national territory convinced Argentina
and the other Latin American countries that the doctrine was
a one-sided policy of the United States and that it was not
designed to extend to them the protection and support which
they had originally interpreted the doctrine to guarantee*
The most important and early disillusionment con-
cerned the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas, which Spain poss-
essed at the time that th United Province of the River Plate
declared their independence. There was a controversy in which
the United States insisted on protecting its American rights.
However, on December, 1831 after the Argentine settlement had
been destroyed in the Ealkland by the American 18-gun sloop
Lexington, Washington declared that the island belonged to
England which has occupied them ever since. This incident led
to extended Qlalm by Argentina which the United States refused
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to accept. (1) In 1885 President Cleveland, in his message
to Congress, said that the government had refused Argent ina*s
indemnity for the loss of the Falklands since the Lexington
had been fully justified in destroying T,a piratical colony"
in view of the "derelict condition in the islands" and their
abandonment before and after the claimed occupation by the
Argentine Colonists. The Argentine government took offense at
the strong words used by Cleveland and Argentina since Cleve-
land's administration has been a bitter enemy of the Monroe
Doctrine. (1)
The incidents creating frietion are very numerous.
The important ones are: our former interventionist policy in
the areas of Mexico and the Carribbean Sea; the role of inter-
national policeman, first formally announced in President The-
odore Roosevelt* s message to Congress of December 6,1604 which
may have been due to the conditions of the times; and lastly
the war with Spain in 1898.
Argentina f s great wealth and energy, its common lan-
guage and social traditions, and its nearness to its sister
republics have tended to give the Argentines the feeling that
their country ought to be the leader o£ the republics south of
the Caribbean Sea. This is easily understood when it is re-
called that from the very beginning, as was shown, Argentina
(1) Haring, C.H., Op. Cit. Page 21
-also see
Levene, R.
,
Op. Cit. Page 423 and Bemis, S.F., Op. Cit. Page 100
(2) White, J.W. , Op. Cit. Page 277
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has attempted to be the leading influence in South .America.
Tactlessness of .American Businessmen
A chief complaint is that American businessmen often
have taken advantage of the good faith of their Argentine cus-
tomers who expected that Americans also based their trade ethics"
on the "palabra ingles". By this is meant that once you have
given your word or your promise you will live up to it regard-
less if more profit can be made by methods which are considered
dishonorable even though perhaps, we would call them "good
business". The Argentines claim that American Investments have
not been of a nature to develop the country but rather to derive
huge profits.
The unpleasant experiences that Argentines had with
the businessmen of this country during and after World War I
were very unfortunate. A large part of the business was done
with firms which were classified as having sprung up over nighty
or with individuals most of whom were not Americans at all.
However, the Argentines knew only that they had paid American
dollars through American banks to concerns having American
addresses and they considered that American trade ethics were
to blame. (1)
Argentina Neutrality during World War I
During the first two years of World War I President
Wilson had favored a policy of strict neutrality and naturally
he tried to influence the South American countries to do like-
CD White, J.W. , Op. Cit. Page 260
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wise. However, when the United States entered the war the
South .American republics were asked to follow suit. Irigoyen
who was then president continued his policy of strict neutrality
regardless of the fact that most other South American Countries
broke off diplomatic relations.
However, the friction was really caused when a naval
squadrcnof the United States on a propaganda tour to Brazil
and the River Plate, stopped at Buenos Aires. This was had
enough since the squadron had been invited to visit Bahia
Blanca but Rear Admiral Gaperton added " insult to injury" by
remaining in the neutral part of Buenos Aires for ten days,
when under international law, the American warships could re-
main only twenty-four hours. Thus, what should have been a
tour of goodwill has been remembered by the Argentines as an
attempt by the United States to break Argentine neutrality.
Movies and Radio
Argentines are conservative in many ways. They do
not like the free and easy way of American life, especially
the behavior between the sexes as depicted in American motion
pictures. The disgusting common-place and vulgarity of many
movies and the inadequacy of American radio programs have im-
pressed the Argentines so unfavorably. The higher education
of the wealthier children usually is continued in France and
not in the United States, because the Argentines believe that
most of the people in the United States are savages from the
cultural standpoint. If one recalls movies that he has seen
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showing college life, G.men, and gangsters* pictures, one can
begin to realize that their opinion of us, which they can only
formulate from personal contacts, news, and movies, is not far
fetched.
American Missionary Against the Catholic Church
It is surprising to read a statement which accuses
the American Missionary as being the most pernicious influence
which is working against a better understanding between the
people of the United States and those of Argentina. (1) How-
ever, according to White, there are some 400 foreign missiona-
ries and their wives in Argentina, not counting the Salvation
army, most of whom are American and are supported by the boards
of foreign mission of religious sects in the United States. (2)
They do not go into the hot Chaco to carry the gospel to the
Indians or into the cold wastes of Tierra del Fuego to preach
to the rapidly disappearing Fuegans, or into the windswept
regions of Patagonia, They live in the large cities of Argen-
tina or their suburbs and devote themselves exclusively to
persuade Christian communicants to renounce the sect they have
and join the one represented by the missionary.
The Catholic Church is one of the most efficient or-
ganizations in all South America. It is heavily subsidized
by nearly all the South American governments, including Argen-
(1) White, J.W.
,
Op. Cit. Fage 266
(2) Ibid Page 267
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tina. Both it and the Church of England carry on real mission-
ary work in the less civilized districts of Argentina, The
proselytizing activities of the North Americans are viewed as
unfair competition, and as long as it continues, it will keep
the Catholic Church anti-American and it has proven itself it-
self to be most formidable in its anti-American propaganda and
for influencing the Argentines to dislike us and be suspicious
of us.
Having considered these " stumbling blocks", let us
see what has been done by the United States to alleviate and
help South America and the relative aid that Argentina has re-
ceived.
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The Export- Import Bank
The Export- Import Bank established in 1934, was one
of the most important agencies to help Latin America and con-
sequently .Argentina. The loans made by the bank were primarily
to encourage exports of heavy goods to Latin America. The two
motivating factors behind these loans we.re:(l) to relieve un-
employment in the heavy goods industries of the United States
by increasing their exports; and (2) to enable the exporters
of these products to meet competition particularly by Germany
in the Latin American Market,
However, due to the circumstances of the time the
policy of the bank was broadened. In September 1940 the Bank f s
lending power was increased from $200,000,000 to #700,000,000, of
which $500,000,000 was allocated for use in ^atin America.
Also, the United States was now in a position to meet both the
emergency needs of Latin America with respect to current short-
ages of dollar exchange as well as the long-term requirement of
hemispheric economic solidarity.
The broad lines of the new financial policy of the
Export-Import Bank were set fotth as follows by Jesse Jones,
Federal Loan Administrator, in a letter of August 20, 1940,
to the Oommitte of Currency and House Banking, supporting an
increase in the Bank's lending powers;
1.To put the bank in a position to continue
to finance exports from this country, prin-
cipally to the Latin American countries.
2. To assist some of these countries in their
.00*.;* rte
economic problems which have been made acute
by the European war, cutting off or greatly-
reducing their exports.
The third statement is particularly significant in
respect to -Argentina.
3. That the bank may, through modest loans
carefully made, assist some of the countries
in increasing the production of the things
that we import and that we do not grow and
must import. While it is not contemplated
that loans would be made on surplus agri-
cultural commodities; appropriate conside-
ration would be given to applications from
some of the governments or their central
banks for loans in reasonable amounts that
might enable the government or the banks
to assist their nationals in the carrying
orderly marketing of some of their agricul-
tural surpluses, with a view to avoiding
demoralized prices that would affect our
own farmers. No such loan would be consi-
dered that appeared to be inimical to our
own agricultural interests.
4. That we may be of some help in aiding
to improve their industrial situation, ma-
king them less independent upon other
countries. (1)
The program was to develop new sources of supply in
Latin America, increase utilization of Latin American resources
for local consumption, adjust the economy of the United States
to permit greater imports of Latin American products that aren't
competitive, and study methods to improve the industrial sit-
ation in Latin America.
Argentine loans as of March 31, 1941 were merely
(1) Foreign Folicy Reports, "Export -Import Bank Loans tc
Latin America" Page 84, June 15, 1941
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#105,000 and committments to make additional loans were
$62,420,000, However, due to the reluctance of the -Argentine
legislature, this committment had not been accepted, (1)
The Export- Import Bank could be an excellent means
for helping Argentina, but with the prevailing Argentine attitude
the Bank has been of negligible assistance,
Lend-Lease Aid
Lend-Lease to Latin America has totaled $127,967,000,
More than 63$ of this help went to Brazil and none to Argen-
tina, Benefits received in return have been maintenance by
our southern neighbors of anti-submarine patrols, their grants
of bases and ports, the rounding up of Axis spies and saboteurs,
the impounding of Axis funds and the supplying of strategic
material. (2)
It is obvious that though Argentina has had some
economic pressure imposed upon her, she has not suffered to any
apprediable extent,
Argentina-Economic Position
Argentina was not, at first, seriously affected by
World War II, The loss of trade with Greater Germany, which
had previously accounted for 15$ of Argentina's exports and 15$
of its imports, was not of negligible importance, (3) Yet,
Argentina was fortunate since it had restricted shipments to
(1) Foreign Policy Reports, "Export -Import Bank Loans to Latin
America" Page 84, June 15, 1941
(2) The New York Times, March 12, 1944
(3) Trade with Czechoslovakia, Austria and Poland is included

Germany to the velue of imports, so that it was not caught
with a large frozen Reichmark balance in Germany at the begin
ning of the war. The Mediterenean was open to trade until
June 1940 when Italy declared war, In the first half of 1940
Italy had bought 40% more from .Argentina than in the entire
year of 1939.
During the first nine months of the war the value
of exports was almost 20% higher than in the corresponding
months of 1938-39. The export surplus was slightly greater
than in September-May 1938-1939.
With the invasion of Western Europe, Italy's entry
into the war, and t he collapse of France, irgentine exports
suffered a severe drop, because almost 40% of Argentina's
normal outlets were closed. The shipping shortage and sink-
ings decreased the tonnage of vessels in Argentine ports
from 4,146,000 in the first half of 1940 to 2,544,000 in the
second half. The volume of all exports declined over 50%
while imports were relatively stable in volume, so that an
export surplus of almost 95,000,000 pesos in the first half
of 1940 was converted into a deficit of over 165,000,000
pesos in the last half of the year. (1)
Comparison of Trade
For the first nine months of 1942 the import vol-
(1) De Wilde, J. and Wood, B. "United States Trade Ties
with Argentina" Foreign Policy Reports, Bee. 1, 1§41
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une amounted to 3,541,342 tons or 25. 4% under the corres-
ponding total of 1941. This was by far the lowest volume in
any like period in the last decade. The export volume for
the same period was 4,103,437 tons or 14.2$ under the volume
of 4,783,000 tons for the corresponding period in 1941.
For this period in 1942 imports were valued at 1,008,788,960
pesos and exports were 1,358,152,947, thus, creating a surplus
of 349,363,987 pesos. Imports in 1941 for the relative period
were 879,071,906 pesos and exports were 1,095,130,344 pesos,
creating a surplus of 216,058,438. Thus, there was for the
first nine months of 1942 and 1941 a surplus of 565,422,425
pesos. (1)
1945 Compared to 1942
The value of exports during the nine months period
of 1943 was the largest for any similar period in the last 10
years except 1937. It showed an increase of 11,2% over the
equivalent period of 1942. However, the value of imports due
chiefly to wartime restriction, was the smallest for any cor-
responding period in the last decade and represented a decrease
of 29.6$ since 1942. Thus, there was an extraordinary "favorable
balance" amounting to 801,703,243 pesos as compared with
350,044,185 pesos for the relative period of last year. (2)
(1) Foreign Commerce Weekly, "urgent ina-Economic Conditions"
Deo. 12, 1942 r
(2) Foreign Commerce Weekly, "Argentine-Economic Conditions"
Dec. 11, 1943
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In the comparison with, the first nine months of
1942, the 1945 period showed an export volume decrease of
14.9$ in the pastoral group of commodities, 8.7$ in the agri-
cultural group, 17,1% in the forest products, and 22.9$ in
miscellaneous products which includes manufactured articles.
Table XXIII
Percentage Decline of Argentine Imports
1943 Compared to 1942
(First 9 Months)
Commodities Decline
Rubber and Manufactures 86.5$
Machinery and Vehioles 67.5$
Textiles and Manufactures 49.8$
Iron and Manufactures 46.9$
Metals ( excluding iron and manufactures) 45.0$
Foodstuffs 21.2$
Wood and Manufactures 19.2$
Paper and Cardboard 12.2$
Beverages 8.9$
Rock, Earth, Glass and Ceramics 6.8$
Miscellaneous Articles 50.0$
Source: Foreign Commerce Weekly, "Argentine-Economic Condition",
December 11, 1943
The ohief decline in imports was in fuels and lubri-
cants-a decrease of 60$ of the total volume decrease during
the current period. The two groups showing increases during

these comparative periods were chemical and pharmaceutical
products, 159$; and tobacco and manufactures, 2.8$. (1)
Table XXIV
Argentine Imports and Exports
By Major Countries
(First 10 Months of 1942-1943)
Item 1942 i94g
($ of Tot. Value) ($ f TotTValue)Imports
United Kingdom 18.7$ 21.0$
United States 32.8$ 20.0$
Brazil 16.9$ 20.6$
Sweden 6.7$ 10.5$
Exports
United Kingdom 33.7$ 30.2$
United States 30.3$ 22.9$
Brazil 3.7$ 8.3$
Sweden 5.9$ 6.4$
Source: Foreign Commerce Weekly, "Argentina-Economic Condi-
tions", January 15, 1944
(1) Foreign Commerce Weekly, "Argentina-Economic Conditions
December 11, 1943

Table XXV
Percentage of
Argentine Imports and Exports
To the United States
Imports Exports
(% of Tot. Value) (% of Tot .Value)
1936 14.6% 12.2$
1937 16.4% 12.8%
1938 17.7% 8.5%
1939 17.2% 12.0%
Source: Statesman* s Year Book, 1939
From these two tables, it is obvious that Argentine
imports from the United States from an average of about 16%
jumped to nearly 33% in 1943 and then declined to 20.0% in
1943.
Exports to the United States averaged 12% of Argen-
tines total export value except for 1938 when it was only 8%
however, like the imports they increased rapidly and in 1942
the average was approximately 30%, however, the average for
1943 sharply declined to 23%. The explanation, of course,
was due to the factors which have been mentioned on page 117.
Argentina's imports declined because of decreases in lubricant
rubber and manufactures, Machinery and vehicles, textile end
manufactures, materials, of course, which are needed inthe
war.
Significance of Breaking Off Relations with ^xis Powers
It was on June 4, 1943 that President Ramirez came
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into power and finally in January 1944, .Argentina severed
diplomatic relations with Japan and Germany which Argentina
had steadily refused to do. Argentina had expressed itself
at the Rio de Janeiro Conference in January 1942, so strongly
as opposed to breaking off diplomatic relations that Argen-
tina succeeded in stopping the United States* purpose of
showing a solid economic and political hemispheric front.
However, after more than two years Argentina was supposedly
going to cooperate with the United States and the benefits
to? all were going to be much improved.
As has been mentioned, Argentina did not receive
any Lend-lease aid and on January 50, 1944 B.D.Hulen in the
New York Times made the following statement concerning the
prospects for Argentina:
"Now presumably some adjustments will
have to be made with Argentina to help
solve economic problems incident to her
severing relations."
Test of Good Neighbors
However, Ramirez was replaced by General Edelmiro
J. Farrell apparently because of disatisfaction with concili-
atory gestures that he had made towards the United States.
The significant trend, however, is that Bolivia, Chile, and
Paraguay recognized the Farrell government before the other
nations could consult, and Argentina's neighbors, Uruguay,
Peru, and even Brazil were wavering between their good neigh-
bor in the north and their "militant" neighbor in the south.
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Eoonomio Outlook
-Argentine's economic outlook for the remaining years
of the war, of course, will be largely dependent upon Argen-
tina's "willingness" to cooperate with the United States,
-Argentina's export for the ten month period of 1943 was larger
for the same period in 1942, but, as has been pointed out,
Argentina is not able to import materials which she needs.
The United States and Britain, of course, will keep on import-
ing what is necessary regardless of Argentina's unfriendly
attitude.
However, after the War, Argentina in due time will
probably trade as she did before the war. Britain will con-
tinue to be Argentina's leading importer, Belgium averaged be-
tween 7-9% of Argentina's exports, France about 5% during the
period 1936 through 1939 and the Netherlands, an average of 6%
for this period. Germany accounts for- about 7% and Italy which
averaged 2,5% from Argentina was 6,2% of Argentina'
s
x
total ex-
ports have been shipped to countries whose position in the world
is uncertain,
Argentina's Economic Outlook with South America
From the following table the exports to the South
American countries can be compared to the total exports, and
it can be seen that the Sister Republics of Argentine import
roughly about 8%.

-122-
Table XXVI
argentine Exports to Principal South American Countries
1936 1937 1938 1939
Brazil $34,484 #43,271 #30,741 #16,780
Uruguay- 2,722 3,762 2,530 3,807
Chile 3,346 4,258 4,295 2,509
Mexico 592 309 379 548
Paraguay- 3,614 3,382 3,581 3,655
Peru 12,407 4.303 3,545 2.151
Total S,A, Ex. 45,965 59,285 42,071 29,450
Tot. World Ex. |1549,365 |757,776 #437,922 #393,293
Source: Foreign Commerce Year Book, 1939
Unless some unexpected factors should arise, Argen-
tina^ Exports should in time increase rather than decline or
remain relatively constant.
Argentine and the United States after the War
The economic relations between Argentina and the
United States depend primarily upon the political relations
that will develop in the near future. If Argentina and the
United States 1 diplomats cannot come to an understanding, then
United States and Argentina* s trade relations with each other
will decrease. Argentine imports as was shown on pages 69-
78, consist mostly of manufactured goods. In Tables XXIV
and XXV the percentage of Argentine imports from the United
States showed that prior to World War II the percentage of
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total value averaged 16$. By 1942, they had increased to
32.8%. In 1943 Argentine imports from this country had de-
clined to 20.6% and the reasons for the decline were due
to the decrease in manufacture' imports because of wartime
restrictions. Thus, if political relations can be straight-
ened out Argentine imports from the United States can in-
crease to a substantial degree even though Argentine ex-
port products are similar to those of which the United
States has a surplus. As aatters are today, the United
States will probably lose a marvelous opportunity, and
eventually Great Britain will be the richer.
Even if the Beciprocal Trade Treaty is not ter-
minated under present conditions, Argentina and the Uni-
ted States will eventually revert to the same policies of
trade prior to the Trade Treaty.
As I have said, Argentines are proud and, there-
fore, they are stubborn, and the United States even with
its Good Neighbor Policy has not been able to win over Ar-
gentina. In fact, if events progress as they are now go-
ing, I doubt if anything really worthwhile will have been
obtained from the Good Neighbor Policy. The Argentines
do not like the manner in which we want to create friend-
ship. We should earn friendship and not try to buy it.
However, as long as the Army Clique and our
State Department maintain their views, I can see n<b ben-
efits being derived by either party. Argentina will con-

tinue on with its bilateral trade "Roca-Runciman Treaty
and trade relations between Argentina and the United
States will necessarily become worse.
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